This chapter deals with the events associated with thefailed December coup attempt in great detail. This overview gives the reader the broad picture, like a road map in a manner of speaking. The illustrations on page show the battle sites during the December coup. The Commission hopes this will help him link one event with the others which occurred in different places at the same time.

The basic assumption behind the launching of a coup is that a concerted attack conducted with speed, surprise, and surgical precision against key facilities of a government in crisis, actual or perceived, will cause its immediate collapse. Such a strategy, however, calls for the total commitment of all the coup forces at one time. As pointed out in Chapter I, in a coup there is no opportunity to change strategy and tactics, replace weapons and men, or correct errors and omissions.

The planning stage of a coup is thus of crucial importance. The strategy, the propaganda, the recruitment, the logistics, and every move necessary for the success of the coup must be set beforehand. These sources indicate that by at least the first garter ofan extensive conspiracy amongst the coup plotters was in motion.

The major players, ex-Lt Col Gregorio Honasan, BGen Edgardo Abenina, ex-BGen Jose Ma Zumel, 1 and others, met frequently with BGen Alejandro Galido, who was reportedly then acting as a deep penetration agent for Gen Renato de Villa, Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines CSAFP.

Galido also had meetings during this period with, among others, Cherry Cobarrubias, Enrique Cojuangco, and Luis Tabuena. An alliance between the RAM-HF Honasan Faction and the Loyalists Zumel Group was forged at this time.

Individual efforts at recruitment, such as those conducted by Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero in Cebu and other parts in the south, were taking place in various units of the Armed Forces.

The activities of the government, on the other hand, consisted of monitoring the various moves of the conspirators and of taking such preventive action as was possible under the circumstances. The failed December coup began inauspiciously on 29 Novemberwhen a Scout Ranger team prematurely destroyed the AFP communications station in Tagaytay. This mission was not supposed to take place until 30 November, since it was meant to signal D-Day forthe 1 December coup.

Nonetheless, despite this false start, rebel ground and air forces commenced hostilities against their pre-chosen targets almost simultaneously in the late evening of 30 November and in the very early morning of 1 December. These targets, picked in accordance with the aforementioned strategic principles, were: Fort Bonifacio, Villamor Air Base VAB together with the Domestic and International Airports, Camp Aguinaldo, Channels 2 and 4, Sangley Point, Mactan Air Base MABMalacafSang, and North and South Harbors.

The Makati business district appears to have been outside the initial plan. At about the same time that two rebel Marine companies, supported by three LVTs and two Vs, launched an attack on VAB, three companies of the First Scout Ranger Regiment FSRR occupied the FSRR Headquarters HQsurrounded and secured the Army Operations Center AOCalmost capturing the Commanding General of the Philippine Army CG PA in the process, and thereafter took over the rest of Fort Bonifacio without encountering any significant resistance.

At the Manila Domestic Airport, gunfire erupted early in the morning as Philippine Air Force Security Command PAFSECOM soldiers engaged rebel troops in defending the airport terminal. However, shortly after 5: A rebel force of about men took over the Baggage Area near Terminal No. Another group led by ex-Maj Lyle Tugbang and Maj Jose Gamos, composed mainly of civilians and Guardians, occupied the main Terminal Building where defending PAFSECOM personnel were herded into a room inside the Terminal Building.

At the Ninoy Aquino International Airport NAIAa PAFSECOM Battle Staff was established which ordered Runways and barricaded with firetrucks and baggage containers to prevent their use. However, rebel forces made no attempt to capture it. The Gamos-Tugbang-led rebel troops were blocked by a unit of the South Sector Capital Command CAPCOM who were deployed at the vicinity of Coastal Road corner MIA Road.

A firefight ensued when the Wockingforce refused to join the rebels. At Camp Aguinaldo, the AFP Logistics Command LOGCOM under Commo Domingo Calajate declared their open support for the rebels at about 8: The LOGCOM rebels backed off, however, and returned to their compound when confronted by BGen Lisandro Abadia, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, who was supported by the 72nd Infantry Battalion 72 IB under Lt Col Alejandro Lasan.

Thereafter, the 2nd Infantry Division 2 ID under the command of BGen Javier Carbonell, supported by five armor vehicles, launched an attack against LOGCOM.

After a firefight, LOGCOM surrendered. AFP Training Command TRACOM at On the following morning at 3: Before dawn, some of the rebel Marines, who took over VAB, proceeded to ABS-CBN and PTV-4 compounds in Quezon City and easily occupied the government television station PTV-4, since the security platoon assigned there withdrew in the face of superior forces. However, Recto was overheard to say that he was thereto attend a press conference.

Lito Gorospe, who was inside the ABS-CBN area at that time, allegedly intended to air some messages, but since the management of ABS-CBN and PTV-4 had disabled the transmitters, none of these events took place. BGen Jose Comendador, the Commander of the 2nd Air Division, took parallel action in MAB by assuming control of the base, and while initially not declaring his position, he later took the rebel side.

Army troops from Mindanao composed of elements from the 23 IB and 30 IB joined Comendador later that day, and secured MAB for the rebels. With the use of minimal force, the rebels took control of Sangley Point. The rebels then successively took over the flight line and the government air assets, then isolated the Wing Commander of the 15th Strike Wing 15 SW in his HQ.

The same action was taking place on the naval side of the base. The rebels equally restricted the Commander of the Philippine Fleet to his HQ, after failing to convince him to join them, and then proceeded to occupy several units of the Philippine Fleet Headquarters.

However, by around 1: Also, the two rebel battalions of the 68 IB and 24 IB which had earlier arrived from Bataan aboard a fishing vessel were permitted to return to their home base. Thus, by early evening of 1 December, Sangley Point was back in government hands.

They conducted bombing and strafing runs over the Malacanang complex. Although two F-5 fighter jets from Basa Air Base were scrambled to intercept the Tora-Toras, no dogfight occurred.

RAM-HF forces with some Customs personnel, led by ex-Lt Col Billy Bibit, had control of the main entrances and exits of the North and South Harbors, and occupied key buildings in both areas.

The Zaragoza Gate Gate 1 and Moriones Gate Gate 2 of North Harbor were barricaded with container vans and cargo trucks by heavily armed rebels. The same thing happened at Gate 3 of the South Harbor.

Personnel at the Coast Guard Station located at the North Harbor were disarmed and the Philippine Port Authority PPA office there was made the headquarters of the rebels. At the South Harbor, the rebels occupied the Customs Police Station and raided the Enforcement and Security Services ESS HQ, while disarming the personnel on duly, and carting away guns and goods of various sorts. However, in the late afternoon, RAM-HF soldiers around the PPA Police Station area started dispersing and leaving.

By earlyevening, the Coast Guard had cleared the North Harbor of some more rebel soldiers. Early in the morning, rebel troopers abandoned the area around the ESS HQ and regrouped by the building where the Office of the Commissioner of Customs is located. Elements of the CAPCOM and Western Pohce District WPD were poised to attack the rebels, waiting only for reinforcements, when two CAPCOM cars unexpectedly entered Port Area through Gate 1 with full sirens blaring.

Alerted, rebel soldiers withdrew through Gate 6. By early afternoon, the North and South Harbors were clear of rebel soldiers. By midmorning, Scout Rangers began abandoning their strong holds in Fort Bonifacio and brought their firearms, mortar tubesm and Howitzer guns to Gates 1 and 2. The Philippine Army Communications Center PACOMCEN and AOC were abandoned by rebel troops as they started consolidating near Gate 2 and the Headquarters Philippine Army HPA Grandstand.

An attempt to negotiate the surrender of the Scout Rangers occurred at this point but when it failed, most of the rebel forces moved out of Fort Bonifacio for the Makati business district.

Company Information

Upon reaching Makati, the rebel Scout Rangers occupied some 22 high-rise buildings in the Ayala business area. Snipers were deployed at the rooftops of strategically located buildings, supported by maneuvering forces on the ground.

In response, the government organized a Task Force Makati, composed initially of elements from CAPCOM and the PC from Laguna and Batangas, to block off escape routes and eventually to retake Makati.

At this time and for some days thereafter, intermittent en-counters took place and sniper shots were exchanged between the rebels and government forces.

Government forces attacked in the early morning, and after a two-hour resistance, rebel soldiers withdrew from the PTV-4 station and joined their comrades near Camp Aguinaldo. The rebel Marine forces, which came from VAB and PTV-4, utilizing LVTs and Vs, commenced their attack on Camp Aguinaldo, alternating between Gates 1, 2, and 3. However, government troops held on to their defensive positions. Meanwhile, the rebels situated by the Mormon Church at White Plains were being subjected to frequent air strikes.

No significant inroads were made by the rebels on this day. After pretending all the while to be on the government side, Blando finally declared himself for the rebels. Fortunately, his two infantry battalions refused to commit outright and to fight the govemment forces in Camp Aguinaldo, eventually causing Blando to surrender the following day, 3 December. However, the company of Scout Rangers detached themselves and attacked Camp Aguinaldo through Gate 4.

The pilots in MAB, under the leadership of Lt Col Antonio Anciano, Commander, th Tactical Helicopter Squadron, escaped from the base and proceeded to the Visayas Command VISCOM HQ in Cebu City. Thus, BGen Comendador was left with airplanes but no pilots to fly them. Both BGen Renato Palma, Commander VISCOM, and BGen Cesar Go contacted Comendador and tried to convince him to give up, The latter refused to surrender, and threatened that should government forces attack Mactan, he would blow up the aircrafts in the base, particularly the two s belonging to Philippine Airlines PAL.

Rebel forces, coming from the White Plains area, initiated combined artillery and mortar attacks. Backed by Marine LVTs and other armor vehicles, ground assaults were launched in the northern vicinity Gate 1 of Camp Aguinaldo and Main Gate of LOGCOMas well as the eastern vicinity LOGCOM perimeter. A rebel V was destroyed, while an LVT was totally burned and partially blocked Gate 1.

Meanwhile, some rebel Marines led by Maj Cesar de la Pefia infiltrated Camp Aguinaldo but government defenders were able to isolate them at the General Headquarters GHQ Dispensary and St Ignatius Chapel. After a brief firefight, the rebels surrendered. Later, at about 6: Elements of the 2 ID then cleared the area of all rebel resistance and secured it against possible counter-attacks. In Makati and Mactan, the period between 4 to 9 December was spent with both sides intermittently threatening, posturing, fighting or negotiating.

On 7 December, at around 9: Mactan followed suit on 9 December when the rebels, headed by BGen Comendador, formally surrendered to BGen Palma in the middle of Mandaue Bridge.

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In the morning of 1 December, the rebels, using air assets captured at Sangley, conducted the following sorties:. Three Tora-Toras bombed and strafed Malacanang complex. Two Tora-Toras strafed government troops in the vicinity of PTV-4.

A Sikorsky strafed government forces around PTV-4. Two Tora-Tora planes augmented a Sikorsky in bombing Camp Crame resulting in the burning of the PC HQ. A Sikorsky hit Camp Aguinaldo twice. Two F-5s scrambled to intercept three Tora-Toras but no dogfight occurred. An F-5 took off to intercept two Tora-Toras. A Sikorsky fired at rebel forces at LOGCOM. Three F-5s fired rockets at the sea waters adjacent to the runway at Sangley.

A Sikorsky struck at rebel positions at LOGCOM. An F-5 piloted by Maj Danilo Atienza took off to attack Sangley, and destroyed the rebel planes and the fuel dump. Two F-5s took off to attack Sangley and fired cannons, strafed the airfield, and bombed the hangar. A Sikorsky made three air strikes at rebel positions in White Plains.

Two Sikorskys struck at White Plains. A Sikorsky and an F-5 struck at White Plains. A Sikorsky made three air strikes at White Plains. Two F-5s made two air strikes at the Katipunan-White Plains area and the Bde was hit by mistake. Two F-5s dropped bombs over Libis area. Two Sikorsky helicopters made two air strikes each over the next seven hours at White Plains; and.

A Sikorsky struck at White Plains. Other air missions after 2 December are no longer listed. While Metro Manila was under seige by various rebel forces, the following incidents took place in Regions I, II, IV, V, VI, X, and XI. Twelve soldiers in the Cordillera region entered a local radio station and insisted in broadcasting their support for the rebels.

Rebel Scout Rangers took over Legaspi City Domestic Airport. However, after lengthy negotiations, they ended their occupation of the airport and were escorted back to Camp Bagong Ibalon.

Elements of rd PC Company left Sorsogon in two buses for Manila but were stopped in Camarines Norte where the Provincial Commander convinced them to return to Camp Escudero, Sorsogon.

Two hundred men from th PC Company gathered at Bacolod Airport waiting for a PAF C to fly them to Manila. When the airplane did not arrive and subsequent efforts to use a shipping vessel at a nearby wharf failed, they were persuaded by the PC Provincial Commander of Negros Occidental to return to their camp. Lt Emil Ong, Team Leader, 7th Riverine Assault Company, wrote BGen Raymundo Jarque, Commander Negros Island Command, offering to resign because he was disappointed with the AFP.

Later, Ong with four men from his company attempted to use the Pulupandan Port but was refused entrance by the security guard at the gate. A group of junior pilots at Fernando Air Base wanted to fly an SP aircraft and conduct persuasion flights over Manila in support of the coup. Col Hector Tarrazona, Director for Operations, th Training Wing, was instructed by WingCommander Col Felipe Abando to persuade the pilots not to do so.

While the meeting was going on, Col Abando ordered the maintenance officer of the rd Field Depot and Maintenance Squadron to disable the aircrafts. Cagayan Gov Rodolfo Aguinaldo went on the air over DZRH in the morning, declaring support for the coup. Five hundred of his men attempted to reach Manila but were blocked in Nueva Ecija.

An officer of the HQ Service Company, PC TRACOM, at Silang, Cavite displayed a banner expressing support for the RAM-HF. They wanted to issue a manifesto in favor of the rebels. He dissuaded them from doing so; but an unsigned manifesto was circulated just the same. Elements of the 56 IB based in Palayan City, Nueva Ecija left for Manila but were stopped in Pampanga.

Before an assembly of officers and men of PC TRACOM, Superintendent Col Renato Motus issued a manifesto expressing support for the rebel cause. Capt Gregory Ramos, Commanding Officer COAlpha Coy, 2nd Light Armor Battalion 2 LAB LABde, with 20 of his men and five armor vehicles left his station at Tuburan, Mawab, Davao del Norte to secure the Davao City Airport in a show of sympathy for the rebel cause.

They encountered a roadblock at Barangay Sasa, Davao City. They were eventually brought to BGen Baccay by Col Danilo Olay, and after a lengthy dialogue, Capt Ramos and his men returned to their camp. Six truckloads of rebel soldiers from 30 IB led by Lt Generoso Bolina boarded MV Nasipit Princess in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte bound for Cebu. Forty officers of the 4 ID at Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro, led by Lt Col Reynaldo Rivera, sought a meeting with their Commanding General to air their grievances, among which seems to have been their objection to the participation of the US Phantom jets.

However, they were made to resign before their Commanding General would dialogue with them. It appears that their resignations were not accepted. With the foregoing overview as a background, a detailed narrative of significant pre-coup events and of each battle zone follows.

The conspiracy and planning which took place prior to the coup is best unraveled by recounting the activities, as gathered by the Commission, of some of the major coup plotters and their supporters and sympathizers.

Honasan escaped from detention on board BRP Andres Bonifacio while it anchored off Manila Bay on 2 April Initially, Mapalo could not establish the desired contact, despite his getting in touch with his former classmates, Capt Ed Oban and LtSG Alex Pama. This meeting was attended by Col Anselmo Avenido, Lt Col Rodolfo Tor, Lt Col Malajacan, ex-Lt Col Billy Bibit, Cmdr Bernardo Patino, and others who Mapalo could not identify. On this occasion arrangements were discussed for a future meeting between Galido and Abenina.

Also, Mapalo was apprised of the objective of the movement which was purportedly for reform and to establish a civilian-military junta to consist of Abenina, Zumel, Honasan, and Galido if he joined the movementtogether with some civilians who are non-traditional politicians.

They Galido and Honasan talked while the van cruised along the South Expressway. Galido also revealed that during the August failed coup attempt, he had an overseas phone conversation with ex-President Marcos, and kept the latter informed about the progress of the attempt.

Meanwhile, on 5 Junethe office of the AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence J2 received information on an alliance forged between the Zumel and Honasan groups for a destabilization attempt to be staged during the first or second week of June In JulyGalido had a meeting at the Manila Garden Hotel, Makati, Metro Manila — arranged by one Cesar Lopez — with a certain Harold Magleo or Maglio, as in some news reportswho claimed he was a colonel with the US Defense Intelligence Agency DIA.

Aquino and the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. According to Col Juan Mamorno, Chief of Staff and Operations Officer SOLCOM, Galido commented after the meeting that he doubted that Magleo was a colonel because he did not behave in a military manner.

In a press statement issued on 3 Aprilthe US Embassy in Manila confirmed that Magleo met Galido once, sometime in April not July as Mapalo testifiedbut denied that Magleo was ever a colonel in the US Air Force or that he was in any way connected with the DIA. The Embassy also said Magleo is employed at the Norton Air Base in California and was vacationing in the Philippines as a private individual. On 2 AugustGalido, Abenina, and Malajacan met at a house in Kamuning, Quezon City. Abenina also gave Galido a series of documents regarding the creation of a new Government Council to be composed of military officers, namely, BGens Abenina, Artemio Tadiar, and Zumel, as well as Honasan, and three unnamed civilians.

In the same meeting, Abenina briefed Galido on the military officers joining the coup, namely: Col Avenido, Secretary, Head-quarters, Philippine Constabulary Staff; Lt Col Gojo, Cmdr Patino of SUBCOM, reportedly representing BGen Tadiar; Col Mamorno, Maj Artemio Gamayo of 16 IB in Magdalena, Laguna; Lt Col Renato Jamora of 42 IB in Catamayan, Quezon; Lt Col Ramon Garcia in Pamplona, Camarines Sur; Col Victor Mayo of 49 IB; and Col Edgardo Espinosa PN M.

Abenina further claims that BGen Blando, CG 7 ID, and BGen Eduardo Cabanlig, Commandant, Philippine Marines PMARwere supporters of the planned coup. Galido asserted that, according to Abenina, the following officers hadbeen assigned to make destabilization tactical plans: Lt Cols Avenido, Gojo, and Malajacan, Cmdr Patino, and Col.

Abenina also informed Galido that, for the planned coup, funds and logistics would be provided by Cesar Lopez and Cherry Cobarrubias. Tadiar testified that Cobarrubias was a close friend of the Marcoses. Cobarrubias, on the other hand, promised to give between P2 million and P4 million once the final plan for execution was completed. In his testimony before the Commission on 15 JuneLuis Tabuena, manager of the Manila International Airport during the Marcos regime, confirmed that Cobarrubias is close to the Marcoses.

She arranged his meeting with Galido at a room at the Mandarin Hotel on 6 September ; she likewise arranged for the long distance conversation between Galido and Imelda Marcos the day before.

Tadiar, meanwhile, testified before the Commission that atameeting with Galido in June or July 21 or July or August at a house in Times St, Quezon City, he Tadiar was surprised to see Cobarrubias whom he last met in Malacanang in She was with a man who was introduced to Tadiar as one Mr Lopez. In a letter received by the Commission on 10 August23 Cobarrubias is described as a coup operator or coup financier tied to the Zaldivia-Aguas front whose dealings link Mrs Marcos to the coup plotters.

Diane Aguas admitted that Cobarrubias is a friend of her former live-in partner, who originally introduced himself to her as Kit Santiago.

Evidence obtained by the Commission further discloses that on 29 NovemberCherry Cobarrubias under the name Serafia C. Cobarrubias checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel. In his sworn statement dated 19 January26 Galido stated that Col Avenido, according to Abenina, was a member of the planninggroup; that Col Espinosa had promised to support the coup with two Marine battalions assigned in Bulacan; and that Lt Col Gojo would take care of getting all the Marines in Fort Bonifacio to join the rebel forces.

On 12 AugustRico Mendoza, representing himself as a close friend of exiled Danding Cojuangco, met Galido in the Quezon City residence of a certain Rafael Ayoste, a businessman from Lucena City. The latter fetched Mamorno at the parking area of the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati for these meetings. Present in the first meeting were Avenido, Pestano, Tor and a PAF officer whose name Mamomo could not recall. He is sure, however, that Espinosa belongs to the Marines.

On those meetings, Malajacan, Tor, Avenido and Pestano were present. The group asked Mamorno to commit SOLCOM forces for the coup; however, he consistently replied that he would refer the matter to his commander. Galido further said in his affidavit that Luis Tabuena received P5 million, evidently from the Marcoses, of which P2 million would be for Zumel and P3 million for Galido. It was BGen Luther Custodio who informed him Galido about the money during a family reunion on 2 September at the residence of Rico Mendoza in San Fernando, Pampanga.

This affair was also attended by Henry Cojuangco and Baby Asistio. Galido then asked Capt Mapalo to contact Cobarrubias to inform Tabuena that he would like to talk to him.

His meeting with Tabuena eventually took place in a room at the Mandarin Hotel in Makati on 6 September. According to Tabuena, he was contacted by Cobarrubias at the Club of Hotel Intercontinental, informing him that Galido would like to see him.

It was Cobarrubias who arranged the 6 September meeting at the Mandarin and when he arrived there at 2: In the presence of Cobarrubias, Galido asked Tabuena about the delivery of the money to Zumel. Tabuena denied navingknown about it, while Cobarrubias did not say anything. According to Tabuena, Zumel was the Military Supervisor of the Manila International Airport for two years when Tabuena was its General Manager.

Gahdo and Cobarrubias had been at the Mandarin Hotel since 5 September. According to Galido, in the eveningof said date, Cobarrubias arranged a long distance call for him with Imelda Marcos who asked him Galido to hasten the plan to destabilize the government through a coup that the Marcoses could return to the Philippines and help the new Government.

Mrs Marcos further expressed her willingness to support the activity financially, however, at that moment she was hard up. She promised to provide support within 24 hours following her arrival in the Philippines. Tabuena admitted that he had known Mrs Marcos since college days when he played basketball and she used to watch the NCAA games.

A year after the Marcoses left the Philippines, Mrs Marcos used to call him once or twice every two weeks; as a matter of fact, two weeks before he gave his testimony to the Commission, Mrs Marcos had called him. She also called him before the December coup to ask what was going on and also after the coup to inquire how many were killed. Ten days after that Mandarin Hotel meeting, he met Cobarrubias at the Intercontinental Hotel and confronted her: Tabuena, however, admitted that he was of the impression that what Galido wanted to take up with him was secret, but that Cobarrubias knew what it was about.

He did not confront Galido as to why the latter insinuated that he Tabuena may have misappropriated the money nor did he inquire as to the source of the money. Tabuena confirmed that Cobarrubias resides abroad and travels a lot to the Philippines, often passing through Honolulu where she has a travel agency. She told him that she visited the Marcoses in Honolulu. He used to see Cobarrubias at least twice a month; however, since after the December coup when she was implicated, he has not seen her.

On 14 NovemberGalido, Zumel, Abenina and Honasan met to discuss a coup slated to be staged before Christmas. On the way to the meeting, Galido rode in a car with Abenina and Atty Homobono Adaza. This meeting was allegedly held either in San Francisco del Monte, 36 or Tierra Pura, Tandang Sora 37both in Quezon City. In Camp Aguinaldo at about 2: Galido said he was annoyed at this unexpected change of date for launching the coup, since the original date mentioned by Abenina was 8 December.

Upon being contacted by Galido for an explanation, Abenina said that he was just notified of the change by Honasan and that he Abenina had no control over the matter, since RAM-HF was calling the shots.

That evening, during the Command Conference called by Gen de Villa at Camp Aguinaldo, Galido briefed the officers on the different coup countersigns white-day 1, pink-day 2, red-day 3, and again, white-day 4, pink-day 5, red-day 6, they had plans for six days as disclosed to him by Abenina.

Galido claimed he turned down both propositions. As an inducement, he allegedly offered Galido the initial position of Commanding General of the Philippine Army and eventually that of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, if the coup succeeded.

Other coup leaders played the following roles during this period: Commo Domingo Calajate at the LOGCOM; Col Alexander Noble in Agusan del Sur and Metro Manila; ex-Lt Col Bibit and Lt Col Victor Batac, in Quezon City and Holiday Inn, Manila; Lt Rasco in Quezon Province, and Lt Col Tiburcio Fusilero in Cebu City.

On 26 November, after the flag ceremony in Camp Aguinaldo, a conference was held at the AFP LOGCOM at which all officers were informed that there might be a coup sometime during the second week of December.

Commo Calajate, Commander LOGCOM, instructed all officers to proceed to camp immediately once they hear about it over the radio. According to him, this information came from a conference at GHQ on 24 November. In breach of the code of honor of an officer and a gentleman, all the time aware of his participation and role in the unfolding coup, and knowing the exact hour it would be staged, Calajate had the temerity to attend the Command Conference at 5: Afew days before the coup, Lt Col Jerry Albano was a frequent visitor of Cmdr Proceso Maligalig, Deputy Commander AFP LOGCOM.

On 1 December, Albano joined Calajate at the LOGCOM, Camp Aguinaldo. From October up to the second week of Novemberat the latest, Col Noble had been going around Mindanao.

He sought to establish links with the Mindanao Independence Movement MIM of Reuben Canoy. He also tried to establish links with landowners who opposed the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and who organized themselves into the Mindanao Freedom Movement MFM. As testified to by former Bukidnon governor, Carlos Fortich, Noble attended conferences of the Mindanao Freedom Movement.

In one of these, which was either held in Cagayan de Oro City or Bukidnon, either early or in the second week of November, both Noble and Canoy attended. This is further evidenced by pictures taken on that occasion. In said meeting, Noble read a paper in which he mentioned secession.

The stand of the MFM was that if a coup succeeded, Mindanao should secede. Noble assured the Movement of protection. On 26 November, while in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, Noble told Sgt Asterio Dejarme of the IBde, 4 ID based in Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, that they would go to Manila to get instructions from the RAM-HF command control, and that they would return to Mindanao to set up the Federal Republic of Mindanao. Dejarme learned that codes and referred to Noble and Honasan, respectively.

At the gate, the driver of the Land Cruiser approached the security guard who directed the former to a van located just outside the gate. Without asking for pertinent papers, the guard unloaded from the van a wooden box which he turned over to the driver and Dejarme. The latter noted that there were four other similar boxes left inside the van. The driver told Dejarme that the items inthebox were financed by the Central Intelligence Agency CIA.

Later, when Noble opened the box at his Fort Bonifacio residence, Dejarme saw that it contained an Armburst anti-tank weapon. Earlier in the morning, Noble revealed to Dejarme that there would be a coup. On 29 November, around 9: It turned out to be No. Other evidence obtained by the Commission disclosed that the address of Crismel Verano, who was mentioned in the Galido affidavit, is No. According to Emmanuel Lao, owner of the lot where House No. The group proceeded to Holiday Inn Hotel where Noble, Batac and their unidentified companion alighted and went inside, leaving Dejarme and the driver behind.

The brown envelope was left in the Pajero; because it was open, Dejarme could see that it contained money which the driver estimated at P1 million. Noble and Batac stayed inside the hotel for approximately two hours. As shown in the discussion below, Bibit had already checked in at Room of Holiday Inn by 29 November. In his testimony before the Commission, Dejarme confirmed the foregoing.

Noble and Evangelio subsequently managed to escape. A letter dated 28 November of one Vic addressed to Sir Alex. Alex was also to call Billy or Jakeor Abe. The codes for them were for Billy, for Jake and for Abe. Please contact other Maninoys for the grand binyag. Papers regarding the establishment of the Armed Forces of Mindanao under the Federal Republic of Mindanao.

List of confirmed radio frequencies of various military units, base stations, and group operations centers. Handwritten notes containing entries about an apparent bank heist. A handwritten note referring to the radio network of the rebels containing the telephone number The Commission traced this number to someone answering on behalf of Royal Match, Inc, and when asked about his location answered that he was in Ayala Avenue.

MGen Flores believes that Vic referred to Victor Batac, Alex to Alexander Noble, Billy to Billy Bibit, Jake to Marcelino Malajacan, and Abe to Abraham Purugganan. Bibit had earlier been appointed by Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tafiada to serve in the Customs intelligence service. Commissioner Mison subsequently appointed him as Assistant Chief, Operations Division of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service CIIS.

In AugustBibit had been seen in Bacolod City with an unidentified companion. The Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ISAFP had earlier warned Mison of the recruitment activities of Bibit in the Visayas in September Mison assigned Atty Jereos, CIIS Chief, to watch Bibit.

However, Mison later admitted he had not given the matter his personal attention, explaining that his business was to raise revenues for the government. On 28 November, Bibit checked in at Rooma suite at Holiday Inn, Manila, accompanied by another man. The room reservation was made in his behalf by his sister-in-law, Fe de los Reyes, secretary of the Chief Engineer of the hotel.

On the first occasion, de los Reyes overheard Bibit making a telephone call; on the second occasion, the phone rang twice and she heard Bibit talking to the caller s. Records of Holiday Inn show that during this period, long-distance telephone calls from Room were purportedly made by one Boy Fuentes to telephone number in BacolodCity.

This is a private PLDT line subscribed to the residence of one George Yap, a former member of the PC-Regional Security Unit 6 operating in Bacolod City. On 29 November, at 3: They tried to convince Gavino to join the rebel forces but he allegedly refused. De los Reyes was later reimbursed by her sister, Mrs Bibit. The soldiers numbered approximately and were commanded by Bibit. Subsequent investigation showed that this bus was originally contracted by Rasco to transport soldiers to Sangley but mistakenly, was sent to Camp Nakar instead of to Barangay Sto Cristo, Sariaya, Quezon.

Rasco and his group got another bus and eventually reached Sangley. Lt Col Fusilero played a leading role in Cebu, particularly in Mactan during the December coup attempt. He was the PC Provincial Commander of Negros Oriental for sometime until his relief for having assaulted a human rights lawyer in Dumaguete City on 4 September The three were charged with violation of Articles ofWar 67,68,96, and 97 before General Court Martial GCM No 8.

Fusilero was placed under house arrest under the custody of the commander who took over from Abenina, BGen Mariano Baccay, Jr. Baccay was later transferred to Davao and replaced by BGen Benjamin Dizon who retired shortly before 30 November Dizon allowed Fusilero to roam around freely.

During the months of September and OctoberFusilero was sighted in Negros Occidental in the company of Bibit, a former PMA classmate, courting the support of military officers and enlisted men for a coup attempt. Intelligence reports were submitted by NICOM Intelligence Officer, Maj Alphonsus Crucero, on the recruitment activities of Fusilero and Bibit as early as September. Although Fusilero was facing charges before GCM No 8 for his role in the 28 August coup attempt, he was not prevented from going to Leyte, certain parts of Mindanao, and Luzon.

With his motorcycle buddies called the Cyclones, he went to Agusan del Norte and contacted logging concessionaire Cesar Magsaysay, in whose company a brother of Fusilero has been employed. In the morning of 29 November, Fusilero instructed Lt Augusto Marquez, Chief, Regional Operations and Plans Branch of the R3 Division, RECOM 7, to contact Maj Anacleto Chagas, CO of the th PC Company based in Toledo City, and to tell Chagas to go to Roy Khan Station Restaurant located at Osmena Boulevard, Cebu City at around 8: Upon reaching the R3 Division office and before he could go into the office of Uranza, Marquez told him that there would be a meeting at Roy Khan Station Restaurant at 7: During this meeting at Roy Khan Station Restaurant, Fusilero informed those in attendance, namely, Chagas, Sandalo, Marquez, Ebuen and others, who were all in civilian clothes, that the coup they have been waiting for, would be staged at After the meeting, Chagas followed Marquez to the quarters of Uranza where they revealed to him the disclosure made by Fusilero.

Cuadra instructed the two not to allow any troop movement, and to adhere to the chain of command. At about the same time, Marquez, who barely had four hours of sleep, reported to his office and advised Superable that a coup would be staged inManila that evening. After advising Lt Col Cuadra, Maj Chagas reported to Col Superable the incident at restaurant. Superable was surprised and got mad upon learning that Fusilero had asked Chagas to send troops to Mactan.

Chagas was then instructed not to make any troop movement and to follow the chain of command. Chagas said that he later went to see Marquez and gave back the P10, to be returned to Fusilero: Mayroon ba kayong balita riyan? To which query Natividad retorted: Imperial said that Superable did not convey to him the information given by Fusilero that the coup would occur at 10 p. Maj Abraham Purugganan and Capt Danilo Lim held meetings in Fort Bonifacio in October and November respectively.

The first meeting was reportedly held at the office of Purugganan. In attendance were Col Luisito Sanchez, Capt Rogelio Bonifacio, Capt Lim, Capt Nestor Flordeliza, Capt Joe Cruz, Lt Stephen Flores, Lt Charles Galvez and enlisted personnel including MSgt Demabildo.

The second was held at the FSRR office and was also led by Purugganan and Lim. Other officers who attended were Capt Felix Calimag, Capt Roberto Rusio, Capt Jose Barao, Capt Pablo Casalme, Lt Allen Capuyan, Lt Samuel Bactad, and 2Lt Napoleon Mabalot. Each was asked for his particular field of interest and function in office.

An intelligence report of a senior NBI agent in Davao City dated 22 January further revealed flights of two private aircrafts during the week of 20 November in the vicinity of Malita at a private airstrip owned by a company controlled by the Cojuangcos and at the Davao International Airport.

Taking these news item and report as leads, the Commission was able to obtain information and evidence which may have some connection with the arrival of Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr, a personality mentioned in the Galido affidavit who incidentally arrived a few days before the coup attempt. On 20 November at 9: The plane was piloted by Capt Adriano Morales and Capt Loreto Vergeire. Capt Morales initially told the Commission that the flight was chartered by Jayapuri Brunei Ltd and arranged through the Executive and Tourist Aviation, a company owned by Chemical Industries of the Philippines, Inc and managed by him.

Ker told Huang that he would arrange for him to visit Kota Kinabalu. The route contracted for, as authorized by Jayapuri, was Manila-KotaKinabalu-Manila. According to Huang, a side trip to Davao City would not make that much difference in price, and so he and Capt Vergeire decided to do it on their own. However, the price differential and the flying time are not likely to be negligible because Capt Morales, in a sworn statement, said that Manila, Kota Kinabalu, and Davao are like the three points of an equilateral triangle as shown in Figure V-l.

The foreign exchange was not surrendered to the banking system. When asked whether a charter contract was in fact executed to cover theflight, Huang claimed: Huang alleged that the purpose of the trip was to make a deal about an oil mill, belonging to an insolvent company under receivership. It was situated about kilometers from Kota Kinabalu, in segnali forex affidabili forum place whose exact name Huang could not remember.

The plane landed in Kota Kinabalu at The pilots and Huang stayed there for three days, billeted in separate rooms at the Hyatt Hotel. Neither Morales nor Vergeire claimed to know what Huang did or whom he met. Capt Morales even disclaimed knowing whether Huang stayed at the Hyatt Hotel in Kota Kinabalu. They agreed to see the oil mill the next day, after which Huang would meet its receiver. On 21 November, Ker and Huang went to the mill site and were there for less than two hours.

The following day, Ker told Huang that the receiver would not be able to meet him. No reason was given. In fact, not even the name of the receiver was revealed by Ker. The wasted time, effort and money did not wem to bother Huang. On 23 November, the plane left Kota Kinabalu at 2: After refuelling, the plane left for Manila.

There are conflicting testimonies on the number of passengers aboard the flight to Manila, but there was unanimity on the point that Huang was not one of them. Huang maintained that although the leg from Davao to Manila was already paid for, he really intended to disembark in Davao all along because it was imperative for him to brief his business associate, a certain Jess Quiogue, on what had transpired in Kota Kinabalu.

He admitted, however, thathe had made no prior appointment with Quiogue. Yet, instead of calling Quiogue from the Davao airport to find out if they could work at home with amazon.com mechanical turk, Huang went to Davao Insular Hotel.

He took his time before trying to contact Quiogue, who turned out to be in Manila. So Huang had to take the last PAL flight to Manila. The Commission also received evidence showing that on 21 November, another aircraft, registered as RP-C, owned by Agricultural Investors, Inc, an Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr company presently under PCGG sequestration, left Manila at Gamboa was left behind in Bacolod.

These two flights present a number of coincidences. For instance, all the pilots are somehow connected with Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. The pilot of RP-C, Capt Jose Castillo, admits to having piloted for Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr several times in the past. The co-pilot of RP-C, Capt Vergeire, was a pilot of the Cojuangcos for 14 years.

He too admitted that he met with Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr at his residence after he had learned of his return. When Vergeire left Manila, as pilot of RP-C on 20 November, he did not know that Castillo was going to fly RP-C the next day. It must be noted that by the time Vergeire in RP-C flew into the Davao How to get more money on virtual families 2 on pc at 4: Morales admitted that he and Usd cny exchange rate yahoo finance started radio contact with the Davao International Airport tower only when they were over Cotabato.

Still, both pilots claimed they knew where the other one was during this time. What seems significant to the Commission is the admission made by Morales that RP-C could have flown from Kota Kinabalu and landed at Malita before proceeding to the Davao International Airport without the government authorities finding out.

Malita is on the direct line of a flight from Kota Kinabalu to Davao City. Morales insisted that they did not land at Malita. However, it took them two hours and 45 minutes to fly from Kota Kinabalu to Davao City and only two hours and ten minutes to negotiate the nearly equal distance from Davao City to Manila. In the meantime, bits and pieces of information related to a coup attempt were either gathered by or filtered into the various intelligence services of the Armed Forces.

In Manila, on 3 November, BGen Rodolfo Biazon, CG, National Capital Region Defense Command NCRDCdetected that a coup attempt was shaping up and that there would be an alliance between the RAM-HF and the Loyalists. On 21 October, in Camp Aguinaldo, elements of the security force of Vice President Laurel under Maj Gamos and Lt Calimag were reportedly preparing plans, vehicles, codenames and numbers, and sketches of streets and buildings, all presumably in preparation for the coup.

At Camp Aguinaldo, on 28 November, an unconfirmed report was received from the Intelligence Office of the Philippine Marines regarding the plan of some officers to launch a coup within the week. FSRR elements were pinpointed as participants. The wife of Lt Rodolfo Cachola was identified as the source of the report.

Mrs Cachola revealed that her husband and another officer undergoing Scout Ranger training gavin holmes forex San Quintin, Pangasinan were called to FSRR HQ in Fort Bonifacio and were briefed on the forthcoming coup.

Lt Cachola relayed this information to his wife with instructions to report it to the Philippine Marines. On 2 November, on suspicion that the Scout Rangers and the Marines would participate in a coup attempt, an artillery battery consisting of five pieces of mm Howitzers were pulled out of the Rangers leaving the FSRR with three defective ones. Before 30 November, BGen Cardones received reports that certain FSRR officers were holding meetings which he believed were for the purpose of motivating people to participate in a coup.

Moreover, before 1 December, he received reports of visits made by BGen Blando to FSRR HQ which were not cleared with him, contrary to military protocol. Cardones also observed that Blando continued to have contacts with Purugganan, Lim, Galvez and Sanchez, all FSRR officers. In JuneEbuen was reported to be visiting PAF bases forex financial global ltd officers and men for the coup.

On 3 October, the PAF Intelligence Office received reports about a RAM-HF plan to undertake a coup attempt during the visit of President Aquino to the United States in November In Octobera group of military personnel was reported to be recruiting at Sangley Point for another coup attempt, allegedly offering P10, to P20, to each recruit.

According to Mabilin, his wife burned the papers. Stock market eps definition Angeles City, before the opening of classes in JuneCapt Felizardo Serapio, Jr, CO th PC Company, was visited by his compadre and PMA classmate Class 77Capt Roque Maranon.

At that time, Maranon was under detention for his alleged involvement in the 8legeof Camp Olivas during the 28 August failed coup. Maranon was allegedly out on pass from detention to attend a court hearing. Serapio also said that, by that time, he had received information regarding recruitment efforts in his area by rightist elements in the Constabulary.

During the PC Day Anniversary celebration in Cebu City in AugustFusilero spread the news that a coup would take place. At Punta Engano, Lapu-Lapu City, in September, an enlisted man under the Negros Island Command NICOM was approached by unidentified persons to join Fusilero in the planned coup. Maj Alphonsus Crucero, NICOM Staff Officer for Intelligence, overheard FSRR officers complaining about the military leadership and about reforming the whole system. In October, BGen Palma held a meeting with major unit commanders in Camp Lapu-Lapu, Cebu City, to discuss rumors of a coup and to emphasize the importance of following the chain of command.

A separate meeting was held with BGen Comendador, who, when fx high frequency trading strategies what his stand was, allegedly answered that he would follow the chain of command.

In the first week of September, Fusilero and other suspected RAM-HF leaders were reportedly in Negros Occidental courting the support of officers and enlisted men.

At Negros Occidental, in the second week of September, Lt Col Anthony Lim of the 5th Scout Ranger Battalion 5 SRB and Lt Col Roy Kyamko, CO 7 IB reported to BGen Jarque, CG NICOM, that Bibit was soliciting their support for a coup attempt. He also inquired from Lopez, CO nd PC Company, about the peace and order situation and gary shilling stock market morale and welfare of the men.

At Bacolod City in August, Bibit was seen with an unidentified companion at the Alice Log Cabin; he was also seen by MSgt Zoilo Ramos at the Golden Field Complex.

In September, a conference was reportedly held on the island of Pulupandan near Guimaras attended by some prominent businessmen and military officers. A separate report was received on the frequent meetings between some hacienda owners and disgruntled PC officers concerning a coup attempt.

However, it was allegedly aborted because the RAM-HF could not secure full support from its contacts. Continuous rebel recruitment to the level of battalion commanders and officers of NICOM was being monitored. A team responded and reported that the armed men were military personnel led by Fusilero. No further action was taken by the police authorities. On 20 November, an alleged study group from the Special Intelligence Training School SITSISAFP, under a certain Capt de Guzman of the PAF, arrived in Camp Catitipan, Davao City, supposedly to conduct a survey among officers and enlisted personnel, directed by google stock market cap meaning CSAPP.

Hence, full red alert status was enforced in all units by BGen Baccay, who also called an emergency conference. It was learned that some junior officers had been conducting clandestine meetings in Davao City for the past few days with 2Lt Cesar Mancao as oil stocks worth buying of the active participants forex fbi robot the meeting.

Initiated by young military officers, the movement plans to sever Mindanao from Luzon and establish a revolutionary government. Diamante stated that the revolutionary government would be organized in coordination with other secessionist groups. Other pre-coup activities which form an integral part of certain events are left out of this section and are included instead in the respective battle zone narratives.

REBEL TROOP MOVEMENTS IN METRO MANILA. December Coup Attempt ]. REBEL TROOP MOVEMENTS IN VISAYAS and MINDANAO. The takeover of Fort Bonifacio was critical because of the tactical importance of the camp. Fort Bonifacio has the biggest ammunition depot in the Philippines where the Light Armor Brigade LABde with their armored vehicles, plus armories of high-powered weapons and combat equipment are found.

Howitzers based in Fort Bonifacio can lay its deadly ammunition all the way to Malacanang and Camp Aguinaldo. Another reason was that the headquarters of the elite fighting units of the AFP, the First Scout Ranger Regiment FSRR of the Army and the Philippine Marines PMAR of the Navy, are based inside the camp.

After hearing several reports of an impending coup, a group of Philippine Army Intelligence Officers of the 15th Intelligence and Security Unit ISU held a meeting in the morning of 29 November at aoaal day trading stocks headquarters.

Unfortunately, the unconfirmed reports proved to be true. On the evening of 29 November, Scout Rangers of the 14 SR Coy, FSRR, under Capt Jaime Junio based in Tagaytay, attacked the PAF Repeater Station in Tagaytay City. This was to signal the start of the attempted coup. This message was relayed to Col Rene Dado, PA Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, G3who was at the Army Operations Center AOC.

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The AOC is near the Communications Center COMCENTER which houses the communications facilities of the Army. As Operations Officer of the Philippine Army, Dado issued a directive to the Post Commander of Fort Bonifacio to strengthen the security of all vital installations. He also directed the CO of Task Force Bonifacio to send elements of his unit to beef up security at the AOC.

There were indications how to earn money fast through vastu tips the attack in Tagaytay was premature. In subsequent interrogation of the arrested rebels by men under BGen Rene Cardones, CG FSRRone of the men arrested remarked to the investigator: He issued M rifles and 60 rounds of ammos with magazines per soldier.

It must be noted that at this time, aside from the FSRR HQ staff and trainees, there were no Ranger units assigned in Fort Bonifacio as all other units were deployed outside the camp. Most of the Rangers inside the camp were trainees at the Retraining Center under Agdeppa.

The Rangers were supposed to graduate by 28 November but to allow them to stay longer in Fort Bonifacio, their graduation was deliberately delayed. It was reported that the sudden increase in the number of Scout Rangers inside the camp was due to the arrival of personnel comingfrom other SR units, like the 4 SRB under Lt Col Galvez stationed in Isabela, the 9 SR Coy under Capt Albert Yen at Fort Magsaysay, and the 14 SR wyunder Junio in Tagaytay City.

By early dawn of 30 November, intelligence officers were receiving mounting information which pointed to an impending coup.

There were reports that Honasan and Bibit were present at Ilang-ilang St, North Cembo in Fort Bonifacio. Counter-intelligence operatives conducted surveillance in the area but found no sign of them.

The arrested soldiers belonged to the 14 SR Coy. He how to earn more money busking ordered the officers to take the necessary security measures in the event that the reported coup materialized.

Also by this time, Col Cesar llano, Commander of the PA Security and Intelligence Service Group SISGreceived a report from Capt Ralph Villanueva, Commander 3 ISU, that a coup was to be launched in the evening of the same day or early dawn of 1 December. He asked his EX-O, Lt Col Rodolfo Garcia, to preside over the conference, so that the former could call up his chief, Col Raul Urgello, PA Intelligence Officer G2.

Urgello, however, was tired and dizzy from lack of sleep due to the interrogation he conducted on Junio, and so he livestock market prices uk structed llano to inform MGen Cacanando directly. At that time, Dado was preparing to leave for Bataan the following day 1 December to assume the command of the Bde.

He told llano that if a coup occurs after his departure, Lt Col Jaime Ligot, the Deputy Operations Officer, can take over. Cacanando left Baguio at around 3: She also asked him to cancel his 4 December trip to the US. Cacanando immediately called his General Staff by phone and ordered that a conference be held at his quarters later that evening upon his arrival.

He also ordered Col Abraham Paray to put all armor assets within Fort Bonifacio on alert status, to which the latter complied. They reputedly were the same elements who were monitored at about 1: There, Maj Rodolfo Espiritu, Intelligence Chief Operations Officer, reported the entry of civilians carrying bayongs on board jeepneys and going to trading in the nairobi stock exchange FSRR HQ.

This information was submitted to the G2. Likewise, Tomas was a most unlikely coup participant. He was with Col Dado macro hedge-fund trading strategies Camp Aguinaldo during the August coup attempt, when they both defended the government against Honasan. During that engagement Tomas was wounded.

The copy for Cacanando was make money fast in farmville 2 by Capt Rodrigo Maclangand was received by Maj Yano at the quarters of Cacanando.

The Scout Ranger rebel troops were consolidated and made combat ready at about 8: In preparation for the planned attacks, Maj Purugganan and Capt Lim held a third meeting at the office of the G2 FSRR to finalize their plans. It will be recalled that their first two meetings were held in October and early November. At this third meeting, the group already included Capt Ed Malabanjot j Leovino Valencia. Their task included the takeover of HPA, AOC, Custodial Company, INP TRACOM, and Gates 1 and 2.

Capt Jose Cruz, FSRR Logistics Officer, was assigned to provide supplies and equipment. Thirty minutes later, they took control of the Area Research Center. Further information revealed that Marcos Loyalist troops were ready to lend their support. He convened the Staff Conference which he had called for while en route from Baguio City. This was attended by the General Staffof the PA with selected Post Unit Commanders. The former ordered the security at Gates 1, 2 and 3, including the detention centers, strengthened.

He gave further instructions to his officers to meet him in a conference at the AOC with the entire Battle Staff. They then proceeded to the AOC at about Lt Col Ligot was at his office inside the HPA when rebel soldiers on board the two 6 x 6 trucks passed by the vicinity of the HPA reception area. He learned from Capt Edgardo Gurrea that the soldiers were not friendly troops. BGen Lisandro Abadia free forex white label partnership from Camp Aguinaldo and, upon being briefed about the development instructed Ligot to lock the HPA doors and not to let the troopers enter.

Lt Col Julius Javier, the PA EX-O, who was at the AOC, tried to call HPA but to no avail as he found the phone lines dead. Ligot then ordered the accounting of personnel who were also told to stay dispersed inside the Army Operations G3 office. Capt Glorioso Miranda who was among the armed troopers outside, went to the HPA to talk to Ligot, who was the highest ranking officer present at that time.

Miranda gave the assurance that there was no intention to harm anyone and requested that the door of the building be opened.

Upon hearing this, Ligot acceded but only Miranda was allowed to enter the building. The latter also requested that the offices of MGen Cacanando and BGen Ramberto Saavedra, Chief of Staff PA, be opened. The rebels pointed their guns and rifles at Government personnel and demanded their surrender.

The latter were disarmed and told to follow 30 seconds binary option strategy contest instructions the captors would give. These troops were students of the Mortar Gunnery Course of the FSRR They took their firearms, M machine guns with bullets each, from the Regimental Troop School. Supply room personnel did not want to allow the withdrawal of the firearms, but were prevailed upon to do so by Capt Fidel Legiralde, Jr.

The intelligence information gathered by Capt Abu about Lt Tomas of the SIP siding with the rebels came as a surprise.

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The situation became serious as the very platoon tasked to guard the AOC had joined the rebels. Lt Estropia then went to the ISG Office and broke the news to Col Ilano.

The latter said they were the SIP. Thereafter, llano left the AOC and went back to his office. As recounted by Col Paray, Lt Tomas was manning a checkpoint near the Bachelor Officers Quarters BOQ in Fort Bonifacio at about Paray was allowed to pass through and proceeded to inspect the 4th Light Armor Company Separate 4 LACS to check on the readiness of armored vehicles and crew in case of any eventuality.

Paray reached the AOC at Before midnight of 30 November, rebels had already ashwani gujral stock market over the HPA, located some meters from the AOC. Col Gopilan at the AOC received a report from Capt Carlos Holganza of the PAPlans Office G5 about the presence of rebel Rangers around the HPA.

Surprised, Lt Manahan relayed this to Maj Carlos Calanog. At the same time, Rangers entering the AOC compound stopped the outgoing wagon at the gate.

Si Maj Calanog yan. Maj Calanog is inside. The wagon was allowed to pass leaving Estropia behind. He later noticed that Lt Yogyog was leading the team of Rangers manning the gate. Phone lines at the AOC were suddenly cut. FSRR elements aboard two trucks arrived at the AOC at about No resistance was put up by the SIP under Tomas. The guards previously manning the gates were herded to one side and instructed not to make any false moves.

Because MGen Cacanando was incommunicado, Gen de Villa appointed BGen Galido as acting CG PA. Among the rebels were Col Sanchez, Lt Col Galvez, Majs Valencia and Purugganan, Capts Yen, DominadorPagulayan, Fernando Abuan, Ernesto Cutiyog, and Essel Soriano and Lts Galvez, Tomas, Alvin Tiamwatt and Agane Adriatico.

Apparently the transmitted misinformation was used to move troops stationed in the north. BGen Orlando Antonio, CG NOLCOM, received the radio message offline typing jobs from home without investment in delhi about 8: However, he disregarded forex cross rate online india message since no radio telephone contact with the HPA could be established for verification.

It was instead referred to BGen Lisandro Abadia. Maclang and Abu wore rebel countersigns allegedly to be able to move freely. After the attempted coup, the two were relieved by MGen Cacanando. He also relieved Col llano of his command for the failure of his intelligence operations. The Scout Rangers led by Capt Legiralde moved swiftly. Aside from securing the HPA, AOC, the JUSMAG compound, Gates 1 and 2, they also attacked the th Custodial Company at the Army Detention Center.

A firefight ensued at the area, including the vicinity near Gate 1. They disarmed the personnel at the th Custodial Company and released the coup detainees from the detention center. The Scout Rangers also rushed to COMCENTER. They disarmed the personnel there, including Capt Feliciano Fernandez, Communications Officer, PA Signal Group, who was in charge of the COMCENTER.

However, Capt Fernandez was able to negotiate and the Rangers agreed not to blow up the communications system; instead, they disconnected the telephone lines at the main distribution frame. A group of about 20 Scout Rangers searched the quarters of key military officers including those of MGen Cacanando and BGen Cardones. The Rangers then made the guards drop to prone east india trading company stock certificate. The Rangers obeyed and proceeded to man the JUSMAG.

BGen Cardones was also not in his quarters when the Rangers arrived, since he was attending the Command Conference held by Gen de Villa at Camp Aguinaldo. When he returned to his office at the FSRR HQ in Fort Bonifacio, and upon hearing that Scout Rangers had taken over major points in Fort Bonifacio, he took temporary refuge in the quarters of Lt Col Javier.

Cardones hid by the creek, staying there the whole night and then escaped by going over the wall towards Dasmarinas Village.

After taking control of various vital facilities and locations in Fort Bonifacio, the Scout Rangers sought to acquire additional arms. Later, they were called to formation and boarded a 6 mcx forex live rates 6 truck with Lt Galvez and were brought to man Gate 2.

Lt Col Salvador Limsiaco, Chief of Staff of LABde, Lt Col Paypon of PAFC, Maj Nescarito Ramos of SSBde and Maj Pablo Bayot of Gl, LABde were stopped by FSRR elements at Gate 2 on their way to their offices.

They were made to board a white Land Cruiser of NAMRIA and they were brought under escort to the FSRR Officers Lounge where they were detained for 11 hours. Limsiaco later reported the presence at the lounge of officers who were not organic to the FSRR and were wearing rebel countersign patches, namely, Lt Col Franklin Brawner, Lt Col Ldgot, Col Leopoldo Aliac, Capt Fundamental analysis software indian stock market and Capt Cutiyog.

Ligot, however, said that he had to wear the patch because otherwise he could not have left the AOC. He was then allowed to leave. Limsiaco saw BGen Moneymaker vs pacman Felix Brawner, Jr and MGen Ret Jaime Echevarria, both in civilian attire, moving about freely in the area near the Officers Lounge. By morning, Capt Philippine stock exchange fort bonifacio and other Scout Ranger officers had gone to theAOC.

Some of the rebels at the AOC, particularly LtCol Galvez and Lts Adriatico and Tomas, tried to recruit him to join the rebel cause. Col Paray, one of the officers hostaged at the AOC, stated that at about Knowing the importance of the assets under the control of Col Paray, Lt Col Galvez, Valencia, Lim and other FSRR officers exerted efforts to convince him to release the 4 LACS and place it under the FSRR.

Lim told him that some of his men had sent feelers wanting to Jon the rebels. While Paray was confident none of his men would join the rebels,he agreed to go to the 4 LACS area to ask for the stand of his men. Only Paray was allowed to step forward. Paray then went back to the Ranger officers and told them his unit would not join. Before the coup, as a precautionary measure, Paray instructed his men that if a coup occurs, the 4 LACS should obey only orders given by him personally.

Lim persisted in trying to convince Paray, who continued to refuse. In their heated argument, the former dropped the name of BGen Blando who he said was expected to arrive at the AOC by helicopter. The latter, however, did not arrive at AOC.

Aside from the armor, the rebel Rangers also sought artillery equipment. De los Santos refused. Pante, who claimed to be the new HGB Commander, allegedly threatened de los Santos that if he would not join the rebels he would be liquidated. Failing to persuade the COs of the 4 LACS and the Artillery stock market 1929 1930 to present of HGB, the Rangers had to make do with only five armored vehicles which they took from the Maintenance Depot, and two platoons of the HGB.

The Scout Ranger officers sought to regroup. When does an earnest money check get cashed left the AOC by early afternoon of 1 December.

At the FSRR Officers Lounge, Col Sanchez released Lt Col Limsiaco and Maj Bayot, but instructed for them not to leave the camp compound. The two reported to the LABde. By late afternoon, Sgt Logan of the monitoring team had reported that some Scout Rangers and AWOL soldiers numbering about had been observed changing their white countersigns to red countersigns.

Early in the morning, Lt Tomas and his security, wearing the RAM-HF countersign, arrived at the firebase and asked de los Santos to tow one mm Howitzer to the AOC building. The latter refused and said that unless Col Dado or Maj Magday instructed him to do so, he would not comply. Shortly thereafter, Capt Pante arrived again and asked de los Santos to bring out the mm Howitzers to defend Fort Bonifacio in case of an attack by government troops from SOLCOM.

They then consolidated at the LABde HQ to rescue the remaining hostages at the AOC. FSRR elements, noting the movement of the armor vehicles, alerted Maj Valencia;he then asked Col Paray to explain the 4 LACS electronic futures trading online broker The latter took this opportunity to request that he be allowed to leave AOC to meet the men.

His request was granted and he went to the Brigade HQ to talk to his officers and men. He reminded them to remain loyal to the duly constituted government. He also wrote a note to BGen Lisandro Abadia regarding the situation which was delivered by courier. The maneuver of the 4 LACS which resulted in all the armor moving out of the firebase left the Howitzers of de los Santos without protection.

To avoid having the artillery fall into 1929 stock market crash effect on global economy hands, de los Santos instructed his men to remove the firing pins of the mm Howitzers, bury them in the nearby field, and to leave their post.

Col Dado held a short dialogue with the two. One of their requests was for the CG PA or G2 to call former CG PA MGen Ret Rodolfo Canieso of NICA and discuss some demands of the Rangers. In the meantime, Capts Yangzon and Gurrea slipped out of AOC through the back exit and established contact with the PA Battle Staff at HHSG.

Dado then went to see Cacanando. Col Sanchez, Lt Cols Galvez and Ochosa, Maj Valencia, Capts Lim, Yen, Pagulayan, Abuan, Cutiyog, Soriano profitable binary options trading platform Tiamwatt, and Lts Tomas, Galvez and Adriatico met with Cols Urgello and Dado, Maj Magday, and Capts Gurrea and Yangzon at the G2 section of the HHSG building.

Capt Lim served as spokesman for the rebels. As a result of the negotiations, it was initially agreed that there would be no fighting inside Fort Bonifacio and that the rebels would recognize the authority of MGen Cacanando.

They also agreed to assemble at HPA Grandstand for accounting of personnel and inventory of equipment. However, instead of assembling at the HPA Grandstand, they consolidated at the Golf Club area near Gate 2 fronting McKinley Road at Forbes Park. Some 66 Rangers under Col Sanchez, Lt Col Ochosa and Maj Valencia returned to barracks. HPA personnel immediately pg diploma course in stock market control of all vital installations in Fort Bonifacio as soon as why invest in singapore stock market rebel forces vacated the occupied areas in the camp.

MGen Cacanando then directed the reorganization and consolidation of his forces to man designated areas including vital installations such as the AOC, HPA Building and COMCENTER. He directed HHSG to strengthen the security of Gates 1, 2, 3, the detention center, and the ammo dump. The Command Contingency Task Force was reorganized under Col Paray.

Inventory of equipment and physical accounting of personnel were conducted by all Post unit commanders. When everything was over and done with, they theorized that it was simply a delaying tactic to allow rebel reinforcements to arrive and to prevent additional government forces from assisting the defenders of Camp Aguinaldo. In an interview with rebel-at-large Maj Philippine stock exchange fort bonifacio conducted by journalist Sheila Coronel of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism on 14 JanuaryPurugganan said that Makati Commercial Center figured in the planning prior to the December 1 activity as a defensive fallback position.

And that position, if you will be able to occupy that, and lookingfrom other areas adjacent. And controlling that area is practically controlling the whole of Makati. The Makati takeover was a very costly incident. Lives were lost; property was destroyed; the tourism industry suffered a very serious blow; and for several days the financial life of Metro Manila, and to a considerable extent of the entire country, was paralyzed.

Although various reports indicated rebel presence in the Makati Commercial Center on 1 December, nothing foretold the events that were to occur the following day. At around noon, ex-Lt Col Honasan was sighted at the Coffee Shop of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila Intercon. Commo Calajate dropped off Navy Stockbroker trainee jobs uk Ison from his beige staff car, somewhere along PasongTamo Street sometime around 7: Things began to stir by midmorning.

Evidence received by the Commission disclosed that sometime between ontario cap and trade system It was paid for in cash and covered by an official receipt numbereddated 2 Decembermade out to the Nacionalista Party.

As early as 1: About 30 Army troopers were scattered on the sidewalk beside the Hotel Intercontinental and in the car park behind. An armored personnel carrier was parked at the sidewalk along Ayala Avenue north of the Intercon.

The NP CENCOM Meeting started as scheduled at 1: Although the press conference was scheduled to follow only later at 3: It is not clear at what time the rebels first entered the Intercon; whether it was before or during the Nacionalista Party press conference. The exact time for the best brokers to trade penny stocks of the rebels could have been easily pinpointed had two hotel officials, Chief of Security Pedro G.

Rojo, and Resident Manager Jean Pierre Etroit, who were most of the time in the lobby of the hotel, during this period, been either more observant, or more cooperative as witnesses. Rojo, whose office was located at barclays stockbrokers transfer to barclays bank plc ground floor of the hotel, claimed twice before the Commission first on 1 March and then on 25 June that he learned of the Nacionalista Party press conference, which was held on 2 December, only on 6 December and from a television news report at that.

As far as I can recall on December 2,regarding the presence of soldiers, all I can say was on or about 6: But before that time all I can remember was there were really soldiers but not inside the lobby but outside the hotel.

The firmness by which he clearly remembered 6: In any case, it was established that at about 2: In quick succession, and meeting very little resistance, the rebels set up their positions in 22 buildings and establishments in the Makati Commercial Center. GHQ AFP could not immediately send its own reaction forces since Camp Aguinaldo was still under attack from the rebel forces at the White Plains area under Lt Col Gojo.

They arrived at Makati at about 4: The MPFF, composed of 92 enlisted men, in full battle gear encamped at Ugarte Field, established a blocking force at the intersection of EDSA and Warren buffett ge stock Road, cara trading forex dengan fibonacci positioned troops along the left lane of EDSA going to Quezon City fronting San Lorenzo Village.

Upon its arrival, the Laguna PC deployed its units. Elements of the RSAF 4 and the PC Coy under Capt Rodolfo de Garcia established an advance command post near the intersection of Ayala Avenue and Herrera Street. The PC Coy under Maj Ismael Rafanan and PHQ elements under Capt Ricardo Marquez conducted reconnaisance at the vicinity of the Mandarin Hotel and along Makati Avenue.

The PC Coy under Capt Felipe Buena occupied various buildings at the intersection of Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas. The PC Coy under Capt Leo Kison augmented the Batangas PC command at the corner of Pasong Tamo solution stock market crash 1929 canada facts Pasay Road while the PC Coy under Capt Luisito Palmera occupied de la Rosa Street. Although initially the government forces were not as heavily armed as the rebels, they nevertheless were able to chalk up some immediate successes.

DZRH reported that the Paseo de Roxas and the Makati Greenbelt areas were clear of rebels but the glass walls and doors of the Interbank Building were shattered. The day ended with government forces suffering some casualties. Mojica, a civilian police aide, checking their road block near San Lorenzo Village, rebels riding a dirty-white Hi-Ace van came by and opened fire killing Macalino and Mojica and wounding Maganto.

Reinforcements from the RSAF 4 arrived and positioned themselves at the overpass infront of Mantrade. The troops were divided into three teams: One V of the government who invented paper money in america hit by rebel anti-tank weapons.

Two enlisted men were killed and Capt Tagaca and five other members of his assault group were wounded. The helicopter maneuvered over Fort Bonifacio and delivered several rounds of 50 cal HMG fire at the rebels located at the multi-level parking lot behind the Intercon. On its second and third attempts, the helicopter gun malfunctioned forcing the aircraft to return to CAPCOM headquarters.

One car had to be abandoned; two security personnel and BGen Aguirre were wounded. Close to midnight, the legit work from home jobs no money down Marine Brigade moved its tactical command post from the corner of EDSA and Boni Serrano Avenue to the area between Ayala Avenue and Pasay Road, to act as a blocking force. At an what are cheap stocks to buy time, Pedro Samatela, a security supervisor of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and Jesus Nava, an assistant, were executed by the rebels who occupied the building.

With the Mandarin in government hands, troopers of the 15 RSAF 4 exchanged fire with the rebels at the Grand Atrium, PCIB and UCPB Buildings. Poblete was able to dissuade them from doing so. Instead, at the request of the rebels, he gave them two cases of sardines and a case of coffee. From Camp Aguinaldo at 11 p. The latter informed the former that they, the rebels, intended to hold on until President Aquino resigned or until they died in the process.

BGen Enrile impressed on him the futility of further resistance and asked that he be allowed to talk directly to the rebel group. Lt Dario said he would inform their leader.

During the night, the Mandarin hired a fleet of taxis and safely evacuated its guests. At about midnight, PMAR troops under BGen Cesar Abella, after conducting patrols at the Forbes Park area, are centrica shares worth buying at the Task Force Makati Command Post.

They were deployed along Paseo de Roxas, Pasay Road, Ayala Avenue, EDSA vicinity Mantrade, and McKinley Road. The Marines at McKinley Road, at about 2: The firefight lasted for two hours.

Twelve government troopers were wounded. While all nonprofit org money maker fighting was going on, the Department of Tourism, between 4: After a brief discussion, the evacuation was agreed to in principle, and with the assurance from Maj Purugganan that they were ready to open the gates of Makati at Because it took some time to mobilize buses, Alunan got to the meeting place only at about Alunan was advised to settle the matter with BGen Aguirre.

The intermittent firing complained about must have been the firefight at the Grand Atrium at about 6: At any rate, Undersecretary Alunan with Tourism Secretary Peter Garrucho, personally went to the Headquarters of BGen Aguirre and asked for the troops to cease firing.

Aguirre gave them 30 minutes, extendable upon request, to iron out the details with the rebels. Aguirre agreed also to give two hours for the actual evacuation of the tourists. At about the time that the Tourism officials were negotiating with the rebels, BGen Enrile, together with volunteer-negotiators, Lt Col Edilberto Adan, Capt Ricardo Morales, Lt Jose Manuel Faune, Lt Clemente Enrique and Capt Arturo Ang, all of the Philippine Army, proceeded to the FSRR Headquarters to gather information about the rebels.

There they were informed by BGen Ret Emilio Luga that he was also able to establish telephone contact with Galvez, Purugganan and Iim at the Intercon. Enrile accordingly invited Luga to join the negotiating team. Garrucho and Alunan returned to EDSA to meet with Purugganan only to find that they were at the Intercon being interviewed by the media. After thirty minutes of mingling with rebel soldiers at Nikko, Garrucho and Alunan were invited to meet with the rebels at the Intercon. After an hour and a half of discussions, the negotiations encountered a hitch as the rebels demanded that the government troops should move back one kilometer from all sides.

Since that was a military issue, the talks were suspended and both parties agreed to meet again the following morning. It must be pointed out that even while the negotiations were going on, sniping from both sides continued. Garrucho noted that he was at one point so close to the shooting that he personally saw a guy on a motorbike get hit during one of the exchanges. Nevertheless, by this time, about seven buildings had already been retaken from the rebels.

Two rebel soldiers, Pvt Clarito Bongo and Pvt Mario Anos, trying to escape in civilian clothes and under cover of darkness, were intercepted at 7: The MPFF troops were divided into three groups: He also promised to call back Enrile.

In response, Enrile asked the caller to contact the Chief of Staff by phone and thereafter call him. Fifteen minutes after midnight, BGen Enrile was again contacted by the unidentified caller, who claimed that de Villa had been contacted and that the rebels were waiting for him at Hotel Nikko.

With the clearance from de Villa, the government negotiators left Fort Bonifacio at about 1: Galvez, Purugganan, Lim and five other members of the rebel group were waiting for them at the hotel lobby. It was revealed at this time that ,the contacts made by the unidentified caller were arranged by Galvez.

De Villa ordered a total ceasefire and prohibited troop movements. Negotiations specifically for the return to barracks started at 2: After two hours, the parties decided to recess and resume negotiations after the evacuation. The guests in the occupied hotels and the residents of the condominium buildings under rebel control started leaving the area at about 7: Some 20 tourist buses under the supervision of Tourism Secretary Garrucho and Undersecretaries Narzalina Lim and Alunan were made available for evacuation.

Alunan, who had the opportunity of meeting with Galvez and Purugganan during the evacuation, observed that Galvez looked demoralized, except when he was talking to media. From Nikko, the government tourism officials proceeded to the Intercon, then to the Manila Peninsula Hotel, and the other buildings thereafter.

Things were not, however, at a standstill on the military side. Garrucho reported that just before he left Makati after the evacuation, he saw a Fiera-type vehicle transporting ammunition to the rebels at the Intercon. Enrile sought to resume negotiations with the rebels but was unsuccessful on account of continued rebel complaints about government troop movements. Talks were formally resumed at 4: At about the same time the 15 RSAF 4 were occupying the Manila Peninsula Hotel, the rebels were consolidating their forces at the PLDT, Allied Bank, Ritz Tower and Twin Towers.

Finally, after the rebels were informed by BGen Enrile that they had only up to midnight to finish their negotiations, an agreement for a return to barracks was reached at about 8: However, it was agreed that no media announcements would be made until the next day. The rebels were to remove the mines they had planted in the area during the night.

It was learned later thathe slipped out just before the final talks. After arrangements were made for the turnover of the buildings to the PA soldiers and the safe passage of the returning rebels to Fort Bonifacio, BGen Enrile ordered their return to barracks at 7: Shortly thereafter, the government forces at the Pacific Star, the Mandarin, PCIB, UCPB and the Grand Atrium buildings advanced and conducted mopping up operations to make sure that the buildings were free of mines.

Afterwards, the buildings were turned over to the civilian security guards to prevent looting and other untoward incidents. On their way back to Fort Bonifacio, the rebels were able to project before the television cameras and the onlookers at the sidewalks a victorious image.

At about noon, BGen Eduardo Cabanlig, Commandant PMAR, claimed that he instructed all units, including the Marine Battalion LandingTeam 4 MBLT4 under Maj Cesar de la Pefla, to go on red alert. He said he sensed unusual happenings. He learned on 28 November from the Marines, who were training with the Scout Rangers at Fort Bonifacio, that their graduation was postponed because they were to move to Pangasinan.

Then, in the morning of 30 November, YOU posters were noticed along EDSA and in the Makati area. At that time too, he was informed of the Command Conference called by the CSAFP to be held at 5: It appears, however, that the instruction was not implemented.

In the list of red alert declarations from 1 September to 1 December for the Philippine Marines HQ submitted by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations PMAR, Lt Col Armenio Cristal, Jr, no red alert was declared on 30 November The last was on 3 November which was downgraded on 13 November. BGen Cabanlig attended the Command Conference in Camp Aguinaldo where they were briefed of the impending coup which was to occur at 2: Thereafter, he returned to his HQ and upon arriving at his HQ at Interestingly, according to Cabanlig, Lt Col Gojo, a relative of Honasan, was also on leave for 15 days before the coup attempt allegedly because of family problems.

After the meeting, they went back to the Battalion HQ. Capt Martir was surprised to see three officers and 12 enlisted personnel who were not organic to the battalion. These officers were Capt Ariel Querubin of the Western Command WESCOMCapt Jaime Napoles of LOGCOM and Capt Juancho Sabban of SUBCOM. With Kapunan, they attempted to bring down to Manila from Baguio the PMA cadets to support Honasan. These non-organic officers had with them VHF radios which were not a regular issue of the Marines.

Querubin tried to convince Calimag not to move yet and just to wait because if he moved to LOGCOM or NCRDC HQ, he would be pulverized by artillery fire as the Army artillery were already pointed towards GHQ meaning Camp Aguinaldo. Calimag said that his unit would follow the chain of command and would move. Querubin was furious; Calimag turned around and told Martir to find out how many men they have and to start arming some of their personnel within the battalion quarters for there may be a firefight to stop them from moving.

Martir moved to his section S3 and instructed his operations chief, MSgt Fortes, to direct all personnel to go to the armory and get their issued firearms and prepare for a possible firefight. While he was giving instructions, Martir saw the personnel of the intelligence unit S2 already wearing white patches on their left shoulders; he already doubted that Capt Querubin had actually controlled some of the MBLT 4 officers.

When he was about to confront those wearing patches, Capt Ferrera entered the room with an Ultimax weapon and machinegun, and proceeded directly to the quarters. Martir, who followed him with Calimag, confronted Ferrera and asked why he did not say that he was committed to YOU during the conference with Cabanlig.

Calimag just remained quiet. It turned out that he arrived from Iloilo at 7: Martir told him that Querubin and Sabban came to convince Calimag who did not give in. De la Pena instructed Martir to call all officers of the battalion for a conference. Just as he had seated, there was a loud knock on the door.

Sir, what is this? Martir also saw Lt Rolando Cal, another company commander who was holding a radio similar to that of Gojo. He went to his office and got his cal. Before he was able to report to Cabanlig what happened, de la Pena approached him and said that they are still friends. Col Millena, Logistics Officer PMAR, called up the motor pool to prepare all available trucks to ferry the troops and one 60 RR mounted on an M truck to be attached to the MBLT 4.

At about midnight, Cabanlig talked to the Marine trainees; he learned later that when they marched back to their barracks with their officer-in-charge, Capt Castillo, rebel officer Lt Liwag pointed a gun at Castillo and Liwag was able to persuade 71 of the more than trainees to join him. No contact was made as the lines were busy.

Cabanlig ordered his Operations Officer, Col Salazar, to block the gates and not to allow the MBLT 4 to go out. Salazar then directed the placement of barricades and ordered the MP detachment to stop the MBLT 4 from getting out. At two minutes past midnight, while his Intelligence Officer was on his way, four LVTs and two Vs followed by troops numbering about rammed Gate 3 and left for VAB.

There were, however, elements of the unit still being formed and so Cabanlig ordered Buenaventura and MSgt Renato Villanueva to talk to them. Evidence further discloses that by late afternoon of 30 November, the Marine officers had already started to mobilize the MBLT 4 based in Fort Bonifacio.

Sworn statements by Marine enlisted personnel show that many of them were ordered to mobilize on the evening of 30 November without knowing that the action was intended for a coup. The troops were moved to different locations. One enlisted personnel narrated his experience. An armed man in fatigue uniform bearing no nameplate arrived at the Headquarters of the Philippine Marines PMAR HQ and ordered the drill inspector to order the men to withdraw their rifles. Hence, firearms were issued and troop formation was done in front of the station of tanks at the PMAR HQ.

Later, the troops of MBLT 4 were ordered to assemble in front of Brown Hall of the Marine HQ. The troops then fell in with their firearms and proceeded to Gate 3 of Fort Bonifacio. There, Cal and his men boarded a ten-wheeler truck which brought them toPTV He announced to the Marines through the radio that he was for the government. He told them not to be deceived by any of the officers and asked them to march back to camp. In the afternoon of 1 December, Cabanlig sent Col Romeo Daranchang, PMAR Chief of Staff, with Lt Col Jose Cordero and Capt Andayan to VAB to convince the Marines to go back.

Cabanlig devoted the whole day of 1 December to the consolidation of his forces. He was able to gather a force of men. Thinking that Fort Bonifacio was still under rebel Ranger control, Cabanlig said that he decided to launch an attack against the FSRR HQ. As they were ready to move, he received a telephone call from the Army Chief of Staff, BGen Saavedra, advising the former to stop from attacking as Fort Bonifacio had already been cleared. At about noon, BGen Aguirre called BGen Cabanlig to request the latter to move his battalion to Paseo de Roxas in Makati.

When Cabanlig cleared this with de Villa, the latter granted him authority to move; he then coordinated with the Mayor of Makati, but this movement did not materialize.

Because of the intelligence reports on the Tagaytay City relay station attack at He requested one V from the PAF Operations Officer to help in securing NAIA but this was denied. Immediately after the adjournment of the Command Conference called by CSAFP in Camp Aguinaldo, MGen de Leon called up his office to inform his officers to be ready for a conference.

Upon his arrival, de Leon convened the conference with the various COs of the PAF, the Unit Commanders in VAB, and the HQ staff at the Hall of Flags on the third floor of the PAF headquarters HPAF. The conference started by about midnight. The vehicles rammed Gate 3 of Fort Bonifacio and followed by about troops following, crossed the bridge across South Expressway and moved towards Gate 2 of VAB.

Immediately, the VAB Unit Commanders rushed back to their units while de Leon, Vice Commander BGen Protacio, BGen Leopoldo Acot and the HPAF Staff rushed to the adjacent Command Operations Center COC which was also on the third floor.

The entries to the third floor were sealed with iron grills and barricaded by office tables. Elements of the 31st MC, MBLT 1 stationed in Sta. Catalina, Bata, Bulacan and led by 2Lt Francis Carandang and 2Lt Gerry Tagle later joined in attacking VAB. The first move of the rebels was to capture the armor assets inside VAB assigned to the th Special Operations Squadron SOS which is under the th Air Base Wing ABW.

The SOS was organized by then CG PAF MGen Sotelo after the August coup as an anti-coup force. It was provided with two Vs, four recoilless rifles, ten machine guns, and other armaments. Yet, when the time came for the squadron to defend VAB, not a shot was fired.

In fact, its two Vs were used by the rebels to attack Camp Aguinaldo on 3 December. Capt Robert Yusay, EX-0 of the SOS, while proceeding to his HQ, met the Marines following the LVTs. Yusay then proceeded to the ABW barracks, woke up TSgt Armando Padilla and his men, and ordered them to take out the two Vs with body number F and F Yusay then radioed the WC to report that his unit, including the two Vs, was ready for action upon orders.

The advise was to maintain the stronghold. TSgt Padilla was brought to Lt Caraig and was asked where the crew were. Padilla refused to answer. This prompted Caraig to threaten Padilla with bodily harm. The van was stuck after overshooting the corners of Zetzer and Andrews Avenues.

After doing so, Padilla requested Caraig to allow him to disengage.

This time, the latter allegedly threatened Padilla with death if he did. Other Marine troopers maneuvered to capture the air assets inside the base. After ramming Gate 2, the Marine LVTs went to the flight line of the HW. Fifty Marines marching at the back of the LVTs disarmed the guards at the Air Reserve AR flight line, and took hostage four officers and 26 enlisted personnel EP.

Capt Antonio Bautista, Commander of the th Tactical Helicopter Squadron, who was still at the flight line, directed two EPs to arm their helicopters. They immediately returned because rebel Marines had already taken control of the flight line. By early morning, several trucks with an estimated two companies had entered the flight line to reinforce the rebel troops. Two platoons with the LVTs proceeded to Hangars B and C and immobilized the nd First Division Marine Squadron FDMS and st Special Squadron SS personnel.

The Marines in the Vs shouted at the Wing personnel led by BGen Loven Abadia to surrender but the latter steadfastly held their ground and placed more M machine guns in front of the HQ.

By dawn, the rebel Marine tanks bombarded the HW HQ area with cannon fire. Rebel Rangers were seen leading the attack. The colonel was mad and he shouted invectives at the Rangers who also approached the wounded man. Hindi ba kami ang sumasagip sa inyo sa bundok? The gunbattle left the HW HQ partially burned and the BOQ razed to the ground. The force of the Marines was overwhelming. They later took control of the HW tarmac.

They, however, were not able to fly any of the helicopters and other aircraft because none of the pilots of the HW HQ would cooperate with the rebels. Other rebel Marines in Villamor supported by armor took control of Gates 1, 2 and 3. Not knowing about the loyalty of the Marines as they passed the th Law Enforcement Squadron LES HQ, its EX-O, Capt Jose Maceda, led a team to investigate Gate 2 where Marines surrounded them and confiscated their firearms.

Maceda identified the rebel officers as Lt Col Gojo, Lt Col Gasmin, Capt Mariano, ex-Lt Col Bernarte, Capt Querubin, Capt Pineda, and another captain with Serial No: The Headquarters of the Philippine Air Force HPAF houses the offices of top PAF officers including the COC which coordinates all movements of the PAF.

They checked out every office including those belonging to Air Personnel, Logistics, Comptroller, Dental Surgeon, Chief of Engineers, and the Chief Chaplain. All telephone lines in the HPAF were cut. Inside the Air Personnel Office, Col Santiago Madrid, PAF EX-O, met the rebel Marines. Gojo wanted to assault the third floor of the HPAF and gave an ultimatum.

Madrid, in an effort to negotiate with the rebels, called the COC at the third floor and was able to relay the ultimatum. Answering the call, the Air Personnel Officer replied that Gojo must deal first with the Commander of the Air Squadron, BGen Acot, before making any move towards the third floor.

Col Roberto Sabularse, Air Comptroller EX-O, and Madrid served as intermediaries who relayed messages between the rebels and the PAF officers at the third floor. They managed to convince the former not to attack the third floor because all the personnel there were already immobilized.

Madrid also tried to convince Gojo to stop the attack at the HW. MGen de Leon, in the meantime, was able to maintain constant communication with other unit commanders and to direct the operation of other PAF bases through the COC.

Fortunately, the personnel of the Office of the Director for Communications-Electronics under Col Edgardo Rosal, who were on stand by at the third floor, ensured the continuous operation of the radio and telephone in the COC. Two more Marine platoons crossed Fort Bonifacio to VAB. Armed with bazookas and machine guns, the rebels occupied the overpass connecting the gates of both camps.

Meanwhile, Lt Caraig, after immobilizing the ABW, ordered the two Vs to be brought to the gate of the SW HQ. The armor vehicles, upon orders of Caraig, rammed the gate but were fired upon. They were then consolidating their forces, with some Marine elements looting the firearms supply and cash storage boxes.

Members of the MBLT 4 boarded a 6 x 6 truck which brought them to PTV The NCRDC Command Operations Center received a report that a helicopter left VAB for Camps Aguinaldo and Crame at about 5: The planes from MAB never arrived.

It was later learned that Comendador prevented the pilots from flying the planes. The Marines wanted to take control of the helicopter air assets in VAB. Ex-Lt Cols Ceferino Sarmenta and Dante Bernarte tried to persuade, but without success, the pilots of ARS under Lt Col Rodolfo de Castro, Squadron Commander, to fly the helicopters out of VAB. Incidentally, both Bernarte and Gonzales were also implicated in the August coup. He was still in VAB when the attempted coup occurred, and he talked to Bernarte who was his previous CO.

The firefight at the HW still raged by early afternoon. The Wing personnel fired at the LVTs and the Marine troops as they approached the HQ area. While at the corridor of the building with some personnel of the HW, de la Torre heard two big bursts from an M grenade launcher fired by the Marines.

These hit the SOS building and wounded its seven personnel. During the lull, women were seen bringing food to the rebels. Loven Abadia tried to contact GHQ AFP to bring reinforcements. However, it was reported that the tank reinforcement sent turned around and joined the rebels. Col Felix Duenas, Air Plans EX-O, called up Col Paulino Poquez, Duty Officer of the HW, to advise the Wing personnel not to return fire as the former was negotiating a ceasefire with the rebel Marines at HPAF.

Both rebel officers refused. Duenas and Sabularse spoke to Loven Abadia proposing a ceasefire wherein Abadia was not to take counter-offensive action provided the Marines desist from attacking Abadia and his men. This proposal was similar to an earlier agreement forged with the rebels at HPAF. Loven Abadia refused, insisting that the Marines should leave the HW area first. But as the Marine troopers continued firing, he fought back. Abadia moved forward and went inside a building near the HW HQ.

Cols Sabularse, Duenas, and Atayde, Deputy Commander of the HW, met with Lt Gener del Rosario of 16 IB, 2 ID, who referred them to ex-Lt Col Bernarte, who in turn, directed them to Col Reynaldo Samaco. While initially insistent that Abadia and his men first lay down their arms, Gojo finally agreed not to fire as long as Abadia and his men would not fire. Col Sabularse and company returned to the HW area but found the HW personnel already disarmed; Abadia, however, was nowhere to be found.

He was still inside a building together with four unidentified lieutenants. Atayde stayed behind while Sabularse and Duenas proceeded to the Air Force Research and Development Center. The two were tasked to see Gojo at the HPAF area to arrange a meeting with either BGens Acot or Protacio.

Then at about 3: Poquez received a call from Capt Edgardo Samonte, CSAFP Aide, that loyal F-5s strafed and destroyed the rebel air assets in Sangley. Unconfirmed news that the F-5s will also go to VAB to target the tanks at the HW flight line made Poquez instruct his personnel to retreat behind the HQ.

The F-5s did not arrive. Instead, three USAF F-4s flew over VAB on persuasion flights. President Aquino made a call at 3: Manalo briefed the President about the situation in his area.

The Marines disabled the helicopters located at the VAB tarmac and those inside Hangars B and C by breaking their chin bubbles and cutting the electrical wirings. Three LVTs, three Vs, two of them with serial nos F and F, and several trucks, joined the Marines.

There was some shooting as they crossed the Magallanes overpass, but they were able to continue towards White Plains. BGen Gerardo Flores, PC-INP Intelligence Chief C2received a report on the departure of the rebel Marines from VAB.

The Bde under Col Edgardo Batenga was dispatched from Camp Aguinaldo to block the rebel Marines at the corner of EDSA and Ortigas Avenue. By midnight, rebel Marines had completely withdrawn from VAB, and government troops once again took control of the base. The commander of SOS also found that their armory had been ransacked, and the cabinets plus table drawers were forcibly opened.

An inventory was made of the supply and the armory. The SOS personnel were then directed to secure Gate 2. The DACE and CS personnel worked round the clock and reinstalled 28 AFP and PLDT telephones that were disconnected in the HPAF offices, including the PLDT cable destroyed during the firefight at the HW. As a precautionary measure against a possible return of the rebels, the Explosives Detection and Demolition Team EDDTwas directed to plant claymore mines and improvised bombs drums of gasoline at Gates 1 and 2 of VAB to prevent possible re-entry of rebel tanks.

The EDDT also scoured the area for bombs that may have been planted by rebel forces. The AFP TRACOM convoy under BGen Pedro Juachon, which included two Vs and a crew from NCRDC, arrived at VAB at early dawn with instructions from MGen de Leon to stay in VAB, defend the base from possible enemy attacks, and apprehend withdrawing rebel forces holed up in Makati or Manila intending to regroup at VAB.

Manila Domestic Airport and Cavite Coastal Road Incident. To the rebels, control of airports is necessary to stop the movement of government troops from other areas and to facilitate the arrival of rebel troops and armaments from the provinces. During the meeting, Raquion assured Gamos that he could supply 15 of his men, mostly members of the Guardians.

Raquion, however, denied any participation in the coup. He directed them to attend a meeting of the Guardians at Baltao Subdivision in Paranaque, Metro Manila that same evening. The 30 Guardians were composed of 26 prison guards, including Manuel Garces, Jr, the founder and leader of the Bureau of Corrections Muntinlupa Guardian Brotherhood Inc Chapter, and four civilians identified as Baggy Sacco, Rolando Pascual, Eduardo Franco and Roger Borja.

The group left Muntinlupa at about On their way to Baltao Subdivision, Morit told them that their mission was to assist the government forces at the NAIA against the expected attack of NPA rebel forces.

The movement of the prison guards was reported by Bureau of Corrections Superintendent Vicente Apurongto Prisons Director Meliton Goyena, a retired PC brigadier general.

Goyena was told that the reason for the movement was to assist the RAM-HF soldiers stage a coup in Manila. Cruz was PRO of the Customs Gun Club when Bibit was the president.

Cruz is said to be an ex-PC Sergeant and former bodyguard of Jackie Ponce Enrile. At the NAIA, Cruz saw Bibit and 40 other armed men, one of whom was Tugbang. From NAIA, the group proceeded to MDA. Gamos arrived at Baltao Subdivision with his armed companions and led them and the Guardians from the Bureau of Corrections to the Ding Velayo Sports Complex across MDA, arriving there at 5: Gamos instructed the Guardians to stay there and await the delivery of food.

About RAM-HF soldiers arrived at the Baggage Terminal Area of MDA and demanded from Lina Precalla, a lady security guard, the keys to the parked vehicles outside. Since Precalla did not have the keys, Capt Bistro, the leader of the rebels, ordered the rigging of the ignition system so the vehicles could be used. They overpowered the PAFSECOM personnel guarding the building and herded them into a room inside the terminal. By morning the RAM-HF forces began using PAL facilities at MDA. The Guardians partook of the food and shared it with their fellow rebels inside the sports complex.

The V returned to VAB by early evening and then proceeded to the South Expressway to wait for other rebel troops coming from Calamba, Laguna. At the Quick Reaction Center at the old MIA, a Battle Staff was created by the PAFSECOM.

There were reports that Bibit used the telephone facilities of DHL office located at the old MIA building. Withdrawal from the Manila Domestic Airport and Confrontation at the Cavite Coastal Road.

They were blocked by government forces from the South Sector Command SSC of PC CAPCOM led by its CO, Lt Col Jose Bandung, Jr. The roadblock was earlier established at 2: The RAM-HF troops sent an emissary in the person ofTSgt Inocentes Dionesa, PC, to request Bandung not to block their way. Because Bandung would not give way, a firefight lasting for about two hours occurred.

During the firefight, Bandung, PC SSgts Leonardo de la Rosa, Melvynne Luzuriaga, Reynaldo Montforte, and Chito Mercado, all of the government side, were wounded.

A Red Cross volunteer was similarly wounded and Airport policeman Ruben de la Cruz was killed. The Guardians from Muntinlupa stayed in front of the Ding Velayo Sports Complexup to 3: No delivery was made. When the RAM-HF soldiers occupying MDA left, the Guardians felt abandoned.

According to the latter, they abandoned their three vehicles prior to their return to Muntinlupa to avoid detection. No formal administrative investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Correction officials and no formal report had been submitted to the Department of Justice about the activities of these guards during the last coup. The takeover of the government television station, PTV-4, located at Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, was crucial for the coup considering that television is a vital medium for propaganda.

When informed about an impending coup, Conrado Limcaoco, network manager of PTV-4, instructed his security aide, MSgt Jesus de Guzman, to advise 2Lt Alfredo Javillonar, PC OIC Security Platoon assigned at PTV-4, that a red alert had been declared at about 5: Javillonar was then at his camp at Bago Bantay.

At about midnight, the 34 MC oftheMBLT 4 under Lt Rolando Cal, arrived at the PTV-4 compound from VAB aboard two ten-wheeler civilian trucks, taxis, and Ford Fieras, accompanied by two Vs. According to Pfc Cadera, the movement was upon orders of Gojo. Other units were also mobilized by the RAM-HF troops.

However, instead of doing so, he brought his men to PTV-4 compound where they were met by several soldiers upon their arrival at around 2: Three unidentified officers fetched Capt Bernardino.

When he returned, he distributed white patches to his men for countersign purposes. Some soldiers withdrew from the area and returned to their station because they sensed that Capt Bernardino deceived them.

The truck driver, Anastacio de la Cruz, said that he was delivering construction materials to Pasay City when he was commandeered by men in military uniform. The two trucks stopped at the pedestrian gate and the men under Lt Cal rushed in side the compound and occupied strategic points. The Vs and the APC proceeded to Scout Albano St. Javillonar ordered the duty technicians to immobilize the television and radio stations.

A reinforcement platoon from Alpha Coy, Security Battalion, under Lt Manuel Visperas and 2Lt Oscar Fajardo, was dispatched to PTV-4 to aid Javillonar and his unit. Fajardo hesitated because the rebel forces were superior in number.

Moreover, government troops and civilian employees of PTV-4 were still inside. Instead, Visperas tried to negotiate for the peaceful and safe evacuation of Javillonar and his men. Cal gave Visperas the choice of either joining them or remaining neutral. Salvador arrived to personally assess the situation.

He negotiated with an unidentified soldier who told him that the rebels were led by Kapunan and Batac. After negotiations, civilian employees and government troops were allowed to leave the PTV-4 compound.

One of his men reported that the armory of the Security Platoon was opened and unidentified Scout Rangers took, among others, three M rifles, one. Personal belongings such as fatigue uniforms and shoes were also taken. Salvador ordered Javillonar to move to GMA-7 and Visperas to proceed to Broadcast City. BGen Biazon gave orders for Salvador to act as negotiator with the rebels at PTV-4, and for Yacat to lead the combined units of the Security Battalion and the Marine forces to launch a tactical assault against the rebels should the negotiations fail.

Rebel troops blocked the corner of Quezon Blvd and EDSA with a ten-wheeler truck. At the back of PTV-4, RAM-HF soldiers started firing at the first MSG platoon.

An exchange of gunfire ensued. A grenade from an M grenade launcher exploded, injuring Pfc Binanitan and Pfc Tironez. The other government troops moved to the intersection of Quezon Blvd and EDSA. The fourth MSG platoon under Capt Javier and the 22 MC MBLT 2 under 2Lt Ramon Mitra III moved towards south of Quezon Blvd while the other platoons turned left towards Cubao.

At the vicinity of Aristocrat Restaurant, about enemy troops were positioned. The government troopers returned fire, retaliating with their V The first, second and third platoons under Capt Bucsit stationed themselves at the corner wall of PTV-4 in Mother Ignacia and Scout Albano intersection. Another firefight started at about 5: During a lull in the fighting, Maj Yacat took the opportunity to negotiate for the surrender of the rebels.

Meanwhile, the fourth platoon was deployed by Capt Javier within 50 meters from PTV They planned to redeploy by squads. When they were about to do so, they were hit by gunfire from 90 RR mortar and bombing from a Tora-Tora plane. The elements of the MSG and the Marine Contingency Battalion failed at this time to retake PTV-4 due to strong enemy resistance and the presence of civilians.

They instead established blocking positions at the intersection of EDSA and Quezon Blvd. While the 22 MC MBLT 2 soldiers were resting at a corner not far from PTV-4, enemy soldiers fired at them. They fired back causing the rebels to retreat.

The rebel planes were also observed flying over Camp Aguinaldo and bombing NCRDC Headquarters by 7: With the former were Capt Romulo Gualdrapa, Capt Edgardo Cabalquinto, Lt Santos Petalio, and 2Lt Adonis Fernandez. From late morning till noontime, radio reports were heard about ongoing negotiations between government forces and the rebels. DZRH reported the negotiations between Capt Javier representing the government, and for the rebels, Lt Paterno Reynato Padua of the Scout Rangers and Lt Rolly Tan of the Marines.

DZRH also reported that Marine Sgt Lloma, one of the APC personnel, defected to the rebel side, allegedly because, their leader Maj Marcelino Lakap was gone and they had no support nor reinforcement from Camp Aguinaldo. Speaker Ramon Mitra, through the radio, urged Sgt Lloma to take charge of the command and not to defect. At noontime, rebel troops posted at EDSA corner Quezon Blvd were able to surround two government APCs near the Ninoy Aquino Park.

With Recto were Joaquin Rodriguez and Edgardo Castro, an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs and one of those involved in processing the issuance of a passport to Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. Both Rodriguez and Castro testified that they accompanied Recto to PTV-4 because he Recto claimed his daughter Plinky was at the adjoining ABS-CBN station and he wanted to fetch her.

We have no orders for a presscon. With that, Recto and his group departed from PTV Fontanilla testified that Recto neither entered the premises of ABS-CBN nor asked him about Plinky. In their testimony before the Commission, Rodriguez and Castro also confirmed that Recto did not enter ABS-CBN. In his sworn statement, Fontanilla stated that he saw Lito Gorospe in the Master Control booth of ABS-CBN with a written statement which Gorospe intended to read and 12 videocassettes which he would show, if they were able to operate ABS-CBN.

The rebel soldiers left the PTV-4 premises at 9: Rebel MBLT 4 troops which occupied PTV-4, moved to Ortigas Avenue. They discovered that the vault of money had been forced open. Guns, ammunition, and personal belongings of the soldiers were gone. Elements of the Security Battalion under MSgt Tangonan recovered the V and towed it to their HQ. It appears that the ultimate objective of the rebels were to take over Camp Aguinaldo because this meant the fall of the symbolic seat of military power and to gain control of the center for AFP military operations.

As early as Junethe AFP Intelligence Office J2 received information on a joint Zumel-Honasan attempt to destabilize government on the first or second week of June The plans did not materialize, although there was information of recruitment inside PAF bases by ex-Lt Col Neon Ebuen.

Information on recruitment continued to be received up to August when Honasan was reportedly meeting unidentified top military officers and government officials. The Bureau turned them over to the PC Firearms and Explosives Unit FEU. Around 26 November, NCRDC Intelligence under Col Benjamin Libarnes received information that a coup would be staged either on December, December, or December ofor January by the joint forces of Marcos-Ver Loyalists and the RAM-HF. There were also information about other plots.

NCRDC Intelligence further reported that the security force under Gamos assigned to Vice President Laurel was preparing plans, code names and numbers, sketches of streets and buildings, and vehicles for a coup. The most compelling evidence was the information given by the wife of Lt Rodolfo Cachola, who was undergoing Scout Ranger training in San Quintin, Pangasinan. On rotation, a Senior Command Duty Officer SCDO is designated for the hectare Camp Aguinaldo Complex.

On 30 November, rebel officers Commo Domingo Calajate and Cmdr Proceso Maligalig, Operations Officer LOGCOM, were SCDO of Camp Aguinaldo and the CDO of LOGCOM respectively.

LOGCOM occupies two-thirds of the land area of Camp Aguinaldo. AFP GHQ occupies the remainder. In SeptemberNavy Capt Manuel Ison, the newly installed CO of the Maintenance Depot of the AFP LOGCOM, completely reorganized and reshuffled the unit, replacing key personnel with his own. His recommendee, Lt Joel Cantos, took charge of the keys to the warehouses which contain oils, lubricants and spare parts. Ison also replaced some of the personnel of the Supply Accountability Office SAO with his own men and at the same time restricted Josue Duque, SAO Officer, from entering the warehouse.

On 29 November, troops started to mass in Camp Aguinaldo. NCRDC Intelligence failed to assess the importance of the arrival at LOGCOM that day of a Marine company from MBLT based in Bulacan headed by Capt Wilfredo Codiacal, EX-O, with a V Pfc Marcelino Peralta said that the company was ordered to proceed to LOGCOM by Capt Codiacal without revealing their mission.

Another Marine guard company, which was assigned to escort supplies to be picked up from LOGCOM, arrived on 30 November from Olongapo. Thereupon, Marcelo mobilized all his troops and by 4: At the same time, he relayed the information to BGen Roman Gavino, Jr, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and asked for confirmation.

The latter could not confirm. They discussed plans to ransack the Civil Relations Service CRS for arms. The Tagaytay incident led Secretary Ramos, together with Gen de Villa, to call a Command Conference which was held at ISAFP in Camp Aguinaldo starting at 5: The General Staff, the major service commanders, BGen Cardones, BGen Cabanlig, BGen Orlando Antonio, CG NOLCOM, BGen Tereso Isleta, CG 15 SW, BGen Biazon, BGen Galido, BGen Loven Abadia, Commo Calajate and other major unit commanders attended the conference which lasted until He added though that it had been aborted.

BGen Biazon, in order to augment the forces defending the camp, told Gen de Villa: Batenga went to Sta Rosa, Laguna to consolidate his forces. He told one of his battalion commanders, Lt Col Alejandro Lasan, CO 72 IB, to proceed to Camp Aguinaldo with two armored vehicles and to engage all rebel troops coming from the south.

They gave the men M guns and ammunition. One of the vehicles was driven by Cpl Lucio Cabil of AFPFC. With him were SSgt Manlangit, SSgt Aloquin, and Wenceslao Lagradilla. The others riding the other vehicles included SSgt Asuncion, SSgt Borbe, Sgt Juni, Sgt Aguirre, Cpl Encotro, Edwin Velcorsa, Sixto Rodriguez and others. The men got off when they reached the area near Gate 5. Only then, claimed SSgt Asuncion, did he realize that he was with the rebel group.

At the same time, about 50 armed military men were reportedly seen at the vicinity of Lambat Disco and Euro Car Sales near the corner of EDSA and P Tuazon St in Cubao, Quezon City. Inside the GHQ premises, rebel troops started to mass.

The AFP Civil Relations Service CRS armory was ransacked by 12 to 14 armed men at 4: Later it was discovered that various firearms were stolen. However, Capt Duque rounded them up and brought them to the grandstand of Camp Aguinaldo, then to the HSC stockade. Confiscated from the rebel MPs were four M rifles and one M rifle. As the rebel MPs were being brought to the stockade at about 7: Later, government F-5 jets were seen encircling the rebel Tora-Tora planes.

The two rebel Tora-Tora planes augmented by a Sikorsky helicopter, again attacked and bombed Camp Aguinaldo and Camp Crame at 9: The PC-INP forces in Camp Crame fired at the aircraft using.

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Because of the burning of HPC, a tactical and operations command post was organized at the Constabulary Security Group CSG building and at the Constabulary Adjutant Building. At the meeting, Calajate said that there was already a failure in the chain of command and that GHQ was no longer functioning as of 4: He further revealed his affiliation with the rebels after telling them that he was the highest link in the AFFs chain of command.

At the meeting, Calajate asked the men who were with him. Among them were Cmdr Maligalig Jr, Capt Manuel Ison, Lt Col Narciso Dauz, Lt Col Nicolas Cabrera, Maj Raul Heredia, and some doctors and nurses. Col Manuel Mariano, Deputy Commander LOGCOM, after reflecting, approached Calajate and told him thathe would not join the rebels, after which Mariano left. The other soldiers were ordered to take measures to secure LOGCOM against government forces.

Lt Col Ramon Palad gave Kabigting masking tape to attach on his left sleeve as a countersign. Maligalig, also wearing a countersign with a drawing on it, told him and the men to withdraw firearms and bullets and secure their offices.

At this point, LOGCOM stopped supplying NCRDC with ammunition. Calajate also instructed that the gate at the Administration Building be barricaded. Also at the meeting with Calajate were Col Francisco Deocaris and Capt Manuel Santos. After the meeting, they returned to the Logistics Training Center. Fearing that there may be instructions to shoot those who went out of the camp, Deocaris stayed put and instructed Capt Santos to secure the office and safeguard their things.

After the meeting, Maligalig with 50 LOGCOM personnel went to the JOC located nearby and tried to take it by force. When BGen Lisandro Abadia, AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations J3heard this, he and troops from 72 IB under Lt Col Alejandro Lasan, began operations to retake JOC.

LisandroAbadia confronted the rebels atabout Some laid down their arms after the confrontation. Their first task was to assist BGen Lisandro Abadia to clear JOC of rebels.

They succeeded and even captured Maligalig. However, after the rebel Tora-Toras attacked, Maligalig escaped. Just about then, troops led by BGen Javier Carbonell, CG 2 ID, and troops from AFP TRACOM under BGen Juachon, arrived and took over the attack of LOGCOM. Over the telephone, BGen Carbonell tried to persuade Commo Calajate to surrender.

When the latter refused, the government forces advanced. During the firefight, some of the officers and men at LOGCOM started to escape. Col Edgardo Kasilag, Chief of Staff of AFP LOGCOM, told the men defending LOGCOM that Calajate had left, and that they were to follow the chain of command.

The troops from the Bde secured LOGCOM by 4: The order to consolidate troops from the 1st Marine Brigade 1 MBde under BGen Cesar Abella deployed in Bulacan was given the night before.

The second battalion was ready to move from their headquarters in Malabon by 2: The two battalions, MBLT 1 and MBLT 2, plus three separate companies, 52 MC, 61 MC and the HQS Coy, left Norzagaray by 4: