Not logged in Not affiliated Cite this article as: Rev Deriv Res Journal of Political Economy Journal of Financial Economics The Journal of Finance 55 5: Executive equity compensation and incentives: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, April , 27— Journal of Business 72 1: Lower salaries and no options: The optimal structure of executive pay. Humboldt University of Berlin. An analysis of the magnitude and the determinants. Bell Journal of Economics Journal of Accounting and Economics The subjective and objective evaluation of incentive stock options.
Stock Options and Managers' Incentives to Cheat by Marc Chesney, Rajna Gibson :: SSRN
Yale Working Paper No. Executive compensation and corporate fraud. Unpublished Working Paper, Louisiana State University.
Journal of Accounting Research Financial Analysts Journal Advances in Futures and Options Research 2: Determinants of market eactions to restatement announcements. Unpublished Working Paper, University of Southern California. The Journal of Finance 59 1: The Journal of Finance The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism. Unpublished Working Paper, Stanford University. Swiss Banking Institute University of Zurich Zurich Switzerland 2.
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